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THE LAW OF TRADE PRACTICES-Il
FALSE ADVERTISING
IRSTON R. BARNES*
ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN THE EcoNomY
Advertising, broadly conceived, includes all representations made
by sellers, or their agents, to induce the purchase of a product or
service.
Advertising is not limited to representations, written or verbal,
that appear in the popular advertising media, such as newspapers or
magazines, or on radio or television. Advertising is also involved in
the way in which the product itself is presented: the trade name used,
the product designation or labeling, and the form of packaging. Adver-
tising is also involved in the way in which the seller represents itself
to the public; the middleman that incorporates the word "mill" or
"manufacturing" into his corporate name does so because he expects
that he will get additional patronage from those who prefer to deal on
a direct basis with the producer. Advertising may be acknowledged
or it may be concealed; advertising appears not only on the advertising
pages of magazines, but it also appears in the form of feature articles
or perhaps in the form of dropped names by the writer or performer
who is ostensibly engaged in providing instruction or entertainment.
The recent "payola" scandal among the radio disc jockeys is a testi-
monial to the importance of "disinterested" advertising. Indeed there
has been some suggestion that advertising need not even be within
the range of the consciousness of those to whom it is directed. At
least, we have been warned that some advertising specialists have been
experimenting with "subliminal advertising" using vision, sound and
odors that are just outside the range of conscious awareness.
The representations which make up the substance of advertising
are too varied to be catalogued. They may consist simply in a repeti-
tion of a trade name, with the objective of conditioning the prospective
buyer to react like Pavlov's dogs whenever they purchase a particular
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kind of product. Or the advertisement may make a more rational
appeal in seeking to establish consumer preference for the advertised
product such as supplying factual or other information with respect
to its characteristics, serviceability, price or other advantages.
1. Requisites of a Market-Directed Economy
A market-directed economy depends for its basic efficiency upon
the success with which markets perform their economic functions of
bringing buyers and sellers together. Full and complete knowledge
of what the market has to offer to buyers and sellers is a fundamental
requirement of effective markets. Buyers must know what products
are available in the market, what the significant differences are among
products which are available to serve a particular need, what sellers
are offering these several products, and the prices at which these prod-
ucts are being offered. Similarly, sellers must be informed as to the
requirements of buyers, both as to quantity and to quality; they need
to know what prices buyers are prepared to pay for these products
of varying qualities and in various quantities; and they must know
something of the qualities and prices of competitors' products.
A market-directed economy is an economy in which society de-
pends upon market responses to the offers of buyers and sellers to pro-
vide the signals which direct producers to make capital investments,
provide productive capacity, employ labor, and supply the product in
the forms and with the quality characteristics which various buyers
in the market require. Similarly, buyers depend upon what the market
has to offer in planning programs of consumption and saving, in de-
termining what needs and desires will first be satisfied, choosing between
a variety of options in such a way as to produce a maximum of satis-
faction and of satisfactory living from the sums which are available
for expenditure.
The performance of markets determines in large measure the per-
formance of the entire economy. If markets function imperfectly-
through imperfect information or manipulation, through misrepresen-
tation or deception-buyers are persuaded to purchase products which
are not fully satisfactory and there has been a waste of basic resources,
of investment and of manpower. If buyers are deceived with respect
to the prices of products, and if thereby markets provide outlets for
producers of defective or shoddy merchandise, buyers are not the
only ones to suffer; honest advertisers and efficient producers have,
in effect, been deprived of equal access to the market and to the at-
tention of the buyers therein. If markets do not function efficiently,
providing outlets for the superior products of the more efficient pro-
ducers, the economy is warped and misdirected in its effort; it be-
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comes wasteful-wasteful in the production of the wrong products,
wasteful in the production of products by the less efficient producers,
wasteful in producing more of some products than is required in
relation to other products which might serve more essential require-
ments.
A satisfactory performance of the market depends upon all buy-
ers and sellers having equal access to the market. Equal access means
the opportunity to come to the market with full and complete knowl-
edge respecting what the market has to offer and what the market
requires. Those who come to the market have an obligation to conduct
their business in such fashion as to facilitate the efficient performance
of the essential market roles. They must come prepared to compete
on an open and fair basis; they must present their requirements and
their products honestly and accurately. Every buyer and seller in the
market has a responsibility to preserve the essential functions of the
market.
2. Advertising in a Market-Directed Economy
Advertising is without doubt the most important manifestation of
competition in the American economy. Advertising is generally credited
with having played a strategic part in building national markets for
a great variety of consumer goods, thereby providing the foundation
for the development of large-scale production and mass distribution.
Without advertising the American economy would have a very differ-
ent prospect, the structure of both production and distribution would
be quite different, and certainly the American standard of living would
have a different composition.
Advertising has the potential capacity to strengthen and support
efficient, soundly functioning markets. With the remarkable advances
in the technical arts of communication, it is possible for local and re-
gional markets to be parts of a single national market. A higher degree
of informed judgment is theoretically possible than at any previous
period in business history. All that is required is that those who control
the sources of information make essential facts available and that those
competent in the arts of communication disseminate that information.
Advertising could contribute to better informed markets, but as one
weapon in the arsenal of competition, it is often denied this economi-
cally useful function.
Advertising obviously contributes to the imperfections of the
market when it is used to make false and misleading representations
with respect to products, to spread misconceptions and misunderstand-
ing instead of knowledge of what the market truly has to offer. In-
creasingly, advertising contributes to imperfect markets by playing a
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determinative role in the selection of those who will have access to
markets. Where products move to the consumer through mass dis-
tribution channels, and where supermarkets, chain stores, and depart-
ment stores prefer to handle products for which there is an established
consumer acceptance, the producer who is unable to engage in intensive
advertising to pre-sell the consumer and establish a consumer accept-
ance which will assure a rapid turnover of his product has but limited
access to the market. It is not only false and misleading advertising
that adds to the imperfection of the contemporary markets; advertising
to establish product differentiation primarily by brand name, rather
than by inherent differences in quality, has the effect of segmenting
the market and of providing preferred access to the market to those
who engage in heavy and continuous advertising. Thus advertising,
which in one form is indispensable to the maintenance of efficiently
functioning markets, in other forms and applications becomes a critical
factor in impairing the functioning of contemporary markets.
Advertising, one of the most widely used methods of competition,
has also been a critically important factor in shaping the develop-
ment of competitive behavior. Advertising is the indispensable in-
strument for making other forms of competition effective: it calls
attention to bargain prices, to improvements in the quality of
products, and to the relative superiority of one product as compared
with others. Where advertising is the main reliance of competitive
strategies, products are developed (or differentiated) to exploit ad-
vertising's potentialities. The product becomes the servant of advertis-
ing. If the product has genuine and significant differences, advertising
can proclaim its advantages across the land. But if the product is in
no way different from a score of competing items, this is no embarrass-
ment to advertising; the product may be fitted out with a brand name
and a distinctive package, and with advertising's assistance, buyers
may be persuaded that it is indeed different-the rose by any other
name may be sweeter than Shakespeare imagined. It is not even fatal
to profitable sales that the product has no virtues whatever; many
patent medicine success stories have demonstrated that it is what the
public believes, not what the product does, that counts. And it is
advertising's appointed task to make the public believe what is profit-
able for the advertiser. With all due respect to Professor Parkinson,
there is another law which might be stated-the less the factual basis
to support claims respecting differences and relative qualities of ad-
vertised products, the more exaggerated the advertising claims tend
to become. The present concern is not with all of the economic and
market problems associated with advertising, as advertising bears on
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the functioning of the economy; it is focused only on those misuses
of advertising which are false and misleading.
3. False and Misleading Advertising
False and misleading advertising is based upon deceit: deceit of
the buyer who is thereby led to purchase a product or service which
he would not purchase if he were fully informed with respect to all
the relevant facts. Advertising may be false and misleading because
it makes untrue statements. It may be misleading although every state-
ment is literally true if it supports false and deceptive inferences, if it
states only half of the truth, or if it fails to disclose material facts
which, if known, would change the buyers' behavior.
The businessman's dilemma with respect to advertising arises
from the compulsions of competition. The ever-present imperative
that guides all business decisions and shapes all business strategies
is the necessity of marketing a product or service at a profitable price.
The main obstacle to that achievement lies in the efforts of other busi-
nessmen to do likewise. The buyer must not only be informed with
respect to the qualities of goods and services being offered, but he must
be further persuaded to make his choice coincide with what a particular
seller has to offer. The seller, therefore, seeks to persuade potential
buyers of the superiority of his ware, its more advantageous price, and
of the greater convenience or other advantages of dealing with the
specific seller. Where the products of rival sellers are indistinguishable,
the individual seller may achieve his sales objectives by offering lower
prices. If price competition threatens to impose losses on sellers, they
may resort to proclaiming the relative advantages of their wares. To
assert superiority of wares requires that the wares be identified by
trademark or brand name, by distinctive packaging or other device.
Thus, the pressures of competition and the hardships of price competi-
tion drive the seller toward product differentiation, real or imagined.
The less there is to actually distinguish the products of one seller from
another, the more important it becomes to persuade buyers that there
are such distinctions, and modest factual statements with respect to
product differences inevitably give way to exaggerations and imagina-
tive claims as rival sellers seek to outbid one another for the attention,
and the patronage, of buyers. Thus, one may almost say that there is
a natural law of advertising rivalry which leads sellers from the realm
of fact to the realm of fancy, from truthful and informative advertis-
ing to imaginative and deceptive advertising.
As the businessman looks at advertising, he becomes aware of
the operation of a kind of Gresham's law, where inflated claims develop
progressively with a deterioration in the value of the advertising to
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him and probably in the value of the product to the buyer. The truth-
ful advertiser cannot await the harsh education of experience to in-
struct buyers in the value of his wares over those of his less scrupulous
rival. Where misleading advertising shouts, where bargains are offered
through fictitious price reductions, where exaggerated claims are made
for the performance of a product, where rational recital of common
sense virtues gives way to appeals to vanity, stylishness or fear, the
scrupulous advertiser is likely to find that a superior product is no
guarantee of access to the market, and that the cheaper quality over-
advertised merchandise tends to drive the reputable, conservatively
advertised product from the market just as truly as cheap money tends
to drive good money out of circulation.
4. Society's Responsibilities for Fair and Functional Markets.
The rise and spread of false and misleading advertising imposes
grave responsibilities upon society. The community cannot remain
indifferent to the plundering of consumers, to the helplessness of in-
dividual businessmen to deal with unfair and damaging forms of com-
petition, to the destruction of markets' essential function of providing
fair and equal access to all buyers and sellers, and to the distortion
of the economy as market competition fails to reward the efficient and
competent producer with opportunities to maintain and expand his
operations. The vast range of products, the technical difficulties of
distinguishing material differences between similar products, the suc-
cession of model changes, and the general absence of meaningful or
intelligible specifications leave even the best informed buyers in a
wonderland of indecision and confusion. Furthermore, business has
done little to develop grades and standards which would enable the
individual consumer to buy more knowledgeably; rather the trend
has been to leave him dependent upon a doubtful faith in a well ad-
vertised brand name. Whether we consider the quality of pre-packaged
foods, the efficacy of drugs, the composition of textiles, the identity of
artfully processed furs, the composition of metal products, the capa-
bilities of motors, or the performance characteristics of appliances, we
are faced with the obvious fact that in today's market the consumer
or buyer is inescapably dependent upon the representations, expressed
or implied, which are made by the seller. And even in those areas where
the consumer is presumably competent to make a judgment, for ex-
ample, in a comparison of prices between similar products, the hectic
pace of contemporary living seldom permits him to go beyond such
comparison shopping as is possible on the basis of the price advertise-
ments appearing in the daily press. Even in this area he buys largely
on the basis of hunch, perhaps reinforced by a test comparison of
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prices on one or two items (possibly loss leader items) that he hopes
gives some assurance that he has chosen to buy where he can to ad-
vantage. Even when the consumer fancies himself competent to arrive
at an informed judgment, perhaps in the purchase of a new motor car,
he is unlikely to penetrate beyond the general styling or the obvious
features of performance, such as acceleration and power, to the more
important values concerned with durability, operating costs, and re-
liability. There is no room in today's markets for a reliance upon the
ancient doctrine of caveat emptor.1
For the individual businessman, advertising is a genie-a potent
servant that may serve him and his customers well, enlarging his
markets and permitting him to attain large-scale, economical pro-
duction, but it may also become an uncontrollable demon threatening
him and his industry with rising costs of distribution and with a loss
of buyer confidence in both product and advertiser. Once advertising
has been adopted as a part of the competitive strategy of an industry,
there is little that the business firm can do to keep it within bounds of
truth or of reasonable cost. The hazards of false and misleading ad-
vertising have long been recognized by the leaders of business. As
early as 1911, Printers' Ink began a campaign for state legislation to
make false advertising a crime. Its model state statute was adopted in
44 states, but enforcement has lacked continuity and vigor. The
campaign was further advanced by the advertising industry itself,
when the Associated Advertising Clubs at their 1911 Convention
launched their "Truth in Advertising" campaign. It was in this climate
of critical opinion with respect to the excesses of advertising that the
first federal legislation was adopted in 1914.
Society's responsibilities for the control of false and misleading
advertising are not based solely on the necessity of protecting consumers
or aiding businessmen to behave ethically. The primary reason for
governmental action to eradicate false and misleading advertising is
to prevent the perversion of the function of markets in the economy.
In a market-directed economy, buyer's choices perform a critical func-
tion in directing economic activity, determining what products will be
produced and what firms shall have an opportunity to continue in pro-
duction to satisfy consumer requirements, influencing by their pur-
chases the expansion and contraction of different industries and differ-
ent corporations, and ultimately providing the guide lines for capital
investment in the renewal or expansion of productive equipment. Buy-
ers are able to perform this essential function efficiently and in the
best interests of the economy only if they have accurate information
1 Hamilton, "The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor," 40 Yale L.J. 1113 (1931).
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with respect to all products and services offered in the market-their
essential characteristics, their comparative qualities, their relative
prices. Society, therefore, has ample reason to be concerned with any
practice which impairs the ability of markets to translate the true re-
quirements of buyers into orders for products from those producers
who are best qualified to use society's resources of labor, raw materi-
als, and capital efficiently.
The costs of false advertising are thus not to be measured in
terms of the sums spent for advertising services, nor in the losses
imposed upon competent and scrupulous producers through the diver-
sion of business from them. The costs of false advertising are far
greater, for they center in the disruption of the essential services which
markets must perform in directing the economy and most seriously
they result in an economy that is not satisfactorily adapted to serving
the essential needs of the community. Where the necessities of adver-
tising come to rule an industry, the character of the industry and the
character of competition in the industry change, and change radically.
Product differentiation, even if based on non-existent differences, may
become a basic feature of competitive strategy. Where the consumer
is unable to judge the quality of the product, as for example with
patent medicines, and where the seller does not expect to depend sig-
nificantly on repeat business, as with fur coats and real estate, the un-
scrupulous advertiser is virtually without inhibitions in his efforts to
capture the customer. Where the product involved is one that the ad-
vertiser expects to sell repeatedly to the same customer, the seller is
called upon to exercise some restraint in the claims which he makes
for his product; in these circumstances the advertising strategy is
likely to work on the principle that "repetition means reputation," and
by continuous saturation advertising the effort is made to "condition"
the consumer to automatic, non-rational buying responses.
If the law is to impose responsibility upon advertisers to avoid
false and misleading advertising, then the law must be prepared to
enforce its rule on all who do not voluntarily comply. The Congress
and most of the state legislatures have addressed themselves to this
problem. The resulting case law reveals American business at some-
thing less than its best; the Federal Trade Commission seeking to hold
back the tide with a few well-phrased principles, and the courts
fitting the law, sometimes with expressed misgivings, to the economic
facts of modern markets.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AGAINST FALSE ADvERTISING
The Congress has dealt with false and misleading advertising in
interstate and foreign commerce in two general laws and in four
special enactments.
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1. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
The Federal Trade Commission Act, although it made no specific
reference to false and misleading advertising, was clearly intended
to deal with this problem as one aspect of the unfair methods of
competition against which the law was directed.' The prohibition
against unfair competition was adopted as a part of an effort to
strengthen the federal antitrust laws and to forestall the developnient
of trusts and monopolies, many of which were believed to have attained
dominant market positions as a result of predatory and unfair business
tactics. Although false advertising was not mentioned in section 5
of the Federal Trade Comission Act, the first two cases decided by the
Federal Trade Commission involved false advertising.' The law did
not define "unfair methods of competition," leaving the Commission
to determine what practices were unfair competition in the light of
the facts of particular market or industry situations. The jurisdiction
of the Commission under the 1914 act was held to demand three
prerequisites: That the methods of competition be unfair, that they
be methods of competition in commerce, and that the halting of the
unfair methods of competition be in the interests of the public.4
In the administration of the prohibition against "unfair methods
of competition of commerce," the Commission soon encountered
setbacks as the courts failed to uphold the Commission's determina-
tions of what constituted "unfair competition," and a substantial
public interest.'
The ultimate demonstration of the inadequacy of the Com-
mission's authority came in the first Raladam case. Here the Com-
mission's cease and desist order was issued against the advertising of
2 Section 5 of the Act provides:
That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlaw-
ful.
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person,
partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of com-
petition in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that a pro-
ceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the interest of the public, it shall
issue and serve . . . a complaint stating its charges . . . and containing a
notice of a hearing .... Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
3 F.T.C. v. Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916); F.T.C. v. Abbott & Co., 1 F.T.C.
16 (1916). Textile products containing no silk were advertised as "cilk" and "silk."
4 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646-647 (1931); F.T.C. v. Klesner, 280
U.S. 19 (1929).
5 "The words 'unfair methods of competition' are not defined by the statute, and
their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to
determine as a matter of law what they include." F.T.C. v. Gratz, 258 U.S. 421, 427
(1920). See also F.T.C. v. Klesner, supra note 4, at 28.
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Marmola, an obesity cure, as a safe and effective preparation for
weight reduction. It contained "desiccated thyroid" and its use with-
out competent medical supervision could impair health. The Com-
mission was reversed because of a deficiency in its findings: it did
not establish that there was prejudice or injury to any competitor.'
2. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938
Acting on the recommendations of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Senator Wheeler, on January 14, 1935, introduced a bill to
amend section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit
unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce. 7 When this
bill died on the Senate calendar, its successor provided also for im-
provement of enforcement procedures and orders of the Commission not
appealed were to become final in sixty days; but the principal argu-
ment continued to emphasize the evils of false advertising and the
difficulties of the "competitors test."8
In spite of much support, S. 3744 died in the House Committee,
and was succeeded by S. 10779 (75th Cong., 1st Sess.), which ultimately
6 "It is obvious that the word 'competition' imports the existence of present or
potential competitors, and the unfair methods must be such as injuriously affect or tend
thus to affect the business of these competitors-that is to say, the trader whose methods
are assailed as unfair must have present or potential rivals in trade whose business will
be, or is likely to be, lessened or otherwise injured. It is that condition of affairs which
the Commission is given power to correct and it is against that condition of affairs,
and not some other, that the Commission is authorized to protect the public." F.T.C. v.
Raladam Co., supra note 4, at 649. Mr. Justice Sutherland does not make what, to the
economist, is the vital distinction between injury to competition and injury to com-
petitors.
7 S. 944, 74th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. See S. Rep. No. 46, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
8 S. 3744, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. See S. Rep. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
9 It was primarily concerned with amending section 5 and with providing procedural
improvements. Senate Report No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., stated:
.. .Section 5 of the present act declares unlawful unfair methods of compe-
tition in commerce, and the pending bill amends that section by also declaring
unlawful, unfair or deceptive acts and practices in commerce. Under the present
act it has been intimated in court decisions that the Commission may lose
jurisdiction of a case of deceptive and similar unfair practices if it should develop
in the proceeding that all competitors in the industry practiced the same meth-
ods, and the Commission may be ousted of its jurisdiction, no matter how
badly the public may be in need of protection from said deceptive and unfair
acts. Under the proposed amendment the Commission would have jurisdiction
to stop the exploitation or deception of the public, even though the competitors
of the respondent are themselves entitled to no protection because of their
engaging in similar practices. It further appears that much time and money must
now be expended in order to establish competition and to show injury to
competitors, as the courts have held that competition and injury to the same
must be established in order for the Commission to retain jurisdiction. Under
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became the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938. However, the significant re-
visions involving false advertising originated in the House, where
legislation relating to food, drugs, and cosmetics was under considera-
tion. S. 1077 was consequently reported to the House with amend-
ments, including the direct prohibition of false advertising and statu-
tory definitions of false advertising that simplified enforcement.'"
The Wheeler-Lea amendments to the Federal Trade Commission
Act were approved on March 21, 1938. Section 5 was strengthened to
declare unlawful not only unfair methods of competition, but also
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."" Revisions in
enforcement procedures provided that the orders of the Commission
shall become final within sixty days unless appealed and that a
penalty of $5,000 for each violation of a final order may be imposed.'2
The provisions of the Wheeler-Lea Act with respect to false
advertising are broad and strong. Section 12 makes it unlawful to
disseminate any false advertisement in commerce by any means "for
the proposed amendment, if the Commission should have reason to believe that
unfair and deceptive acts and practices are being engaged in, and that it is in
the public interest that they be stopped, it could issue its restraining order
without being put to the necessity of establishing competition and injury to
such competition ...
10 H.R. 1613 (Aug. 19, 1937), to accompany S. 1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., stated
the case for the advertising amendments as follows:
Salesmanship and advertising are inextricable from the promotion and
operation of business under our economic system. They have the common pur-
pose of inducing the purchase of the seller's product .... Reasonable latitude
must be conceded to the salesman and advertiser in boosting his own product.
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the evils and abuses of advertising;
the imposition on the unsuspecting; and the downright criminality of preying
upon the sick as well as the consuming public through fraudulent, false, and
subtle misleading advertisements.
The provisions of this bill covering false advertising are far-reaching but
we believe entirely warranted, necessary for the effective control of illegitimate
advertising and yet drawn with due regard to the rights of legitimate advertising.
We believe the legislation is based on necessity and sound reason and that due
discrimination has been made in applying penalties to fit the varying magnitudes
of the offenses involved.
Among the most obvious needs of the Federal Trade Commission Act are
those giving more effective control over advertisements affecting the public
health and fraudulent impositions as to its food and medical supplies.
The advertising amendments to this bill revolve around the definition of
a "false advertisement" in Section 15. A false advertisement is defined as
one "which is misleading in a material respect." . . .
11 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), amend-
ing 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
12 Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 5(g)(1), (1), 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(g) (1), (1), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
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the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or
indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices, or
cosmetics," and any such dissemination is made an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in commerce within the meaning of section 5.13 Section
15 defines "false advertisement" as "an advertisement, other than
labeling, which is misleading in a material respect;" and it may be
misleading not only by reason of representations made or suggested,
but also if "the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the
light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result from the use of the commodity . . . under the
conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions
as are customary or usual." 4 The Commission follows its established
procedure of investigation, hearings, and cease and desist orders in
the enforcement of the prohibitions against false advertising. How-
ever, the Commission may seek an injunction pending the issuance
of its order when such action appears to be in the public interest. 5
A penalty of $5,000 and a prison sentence of six months for the first
conviction ($10,000 and a year in prison for subsequent convictions)
is provided for the dissemination of false advertising "if the use of
the commodity advertised may be injurious to health because of results
from such use under conditions prescribed in the advertisement there-
of, or under such conditions as are customary or usual, or if such viola-
tion is with intent to defraud or mislead." 6 However, no publisher or
advertising agency is liable under this section unless it refuses on
request to furnish the Commission with the name and address of
any advertiser causing the dissemination of such false advertisement.
3. Wool Products
The campaign for honest presentation of products took another
step forward with the adoption of the Wool Products Labeling Act
13 Federal Trade Commission Act § 12(a), 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52(a).
14 Federal Trade Commission Act § 15(a), 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1).
Section 15 also provides definitions of "food, drugs, devices and cosmetics." The Com-
mission may still proceed against deceptive labeling under section 5.
An exception to section 15(a), defining false advertisement, is made with respect
to statements to the medical profession:
No advertisement of a drug shall be deemed to be false if it is disseminated
only to members of the medical profession, contains no false representation of
a material fact, and includes, or is accompanied in each instance by truthful
disclosure of, the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such
drug.
15 Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(a), 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a).
The statute makes provision for excluding from such injunctions the circulation of news-
papers and periodicals with regularly scheduled publication dates.
16 Federal Trade Commission Act § 14(a), 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 54(a).
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of 1939.1' The protection of the consumer and the safeguarding of
fair practices in merchandising are to be accomplished by requiring
informative labeling."8 A wool product is any product containing, or
purporting to contain, wool.' 9 The informative label must show the
percentages of "wool," "reprocessed wool," or "reused wool," the
percentages of any other fiber constituting more than 5 percent, and
the name of the manufacturer; any manufacturer or distributor of
wool products is made responsible for correcting any label not con-
taining the requisite information. ° A wool product lacking the
prescribed label is misbranded. Any person who manufacturers or
ships in commerce any wool product which is misbranded within the
meaning of the Act and the rules and regulations adopted by the
Commission l "is guilty of an unfair method of competition, and an
unfair and deceptive act or practice in commerce" within the meaning
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
4. Fur Products
The Fur Products Labeling Act23 adapted the principles of in-
formative labeling to a product category that was particularly prone
17 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j.
Is In H.R. Rep. No. 907, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., the necessity for the bill was stated
in these terms:
Heading the list of materials used in the manufacture of garments as in
widest use and most subject to the use in manufacture of shoddy, rags, and
reclaimed or reused wool fibers, the testimony shows that, of some 500,000,000
pounds of wool fabricated into garments annually, nearly one-third of it comes
under the heading of reused wool . ..
This legislation, while strongly endorsed by wool and stock growers and
farm organizations generally, is not simply or even mainly to benefit the wool
industry, but to protect the 90 percent of the American people who must, as
the hearings disclose, purchase garment suits at a cost of $25 or less....
The movement originated, not with the groups pressing for this legisla-
tion, but with unfair and deceptive acts and practices originating in the
industry. The legislation is a logical and necessary part of the growing body
of legislation to protect the consuming public in the field of food, drugs, meat
inspection, honest weights and measures, and only recently by the passage by
the House of a seed-labeling act much more drastic than the pending bill.
19 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939 § 2(e), 54 Stat. 1129 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 68(e).
20 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939 § 4, 54 Stat. 1129 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68f.
21 Rules and Regulations under the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, Promul-
gated by the Federal Trade Commission, effective July 15, 1941, as amended August 1,
1949 and November 14, 1953.
22 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939 § 3, 54 Stat. 1129 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68a.
23 Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j.
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to misrepresentations and where the average consumer was quite
helpless in judging the true qualities of the garment.24
The law provides that a fur product is misbranded if it is falsely
or deceptively labeled, if the label contains any form of misrepresenta-
tion or deception, or if the label does not plainly show certain enumer-
ated facts. Thus, a label must give the proper name of the animal
from which the fur comes, disclose if it contains used fur, specify if
it is dyed or artificially colored, indicate any use of "paws, tails,
bellies, or waste fur," and give the name of the manufacturer and
the country of origin.25 The same information must be contained in
any advertisement and on the invoice.26 It is also falsely invoiced if
it contains "any form of misrepresentation or deception, directly or
by implication, with respect to such fur product or fur." To implement
this provision, the Commission's Rules and Regulations deal not only
with the matters enumerated in the act, but also prohibit fictitious and
deceptive pricings on invoices and in advertising.27 The misbranding
or false advertising and invoicing of furs and fur products is unlawful
and shall be an unfair method of competition, and an unfair and
deceptive act or practice in commerce under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.28
5. Textile Fibers
Technology as well as art can leave the consumer incompetent
to judge products. Such is the situation with respect to the synthetic
fibers. In recognition of the confusion arising from the multiplicity
of trade names to describe various man-made fibers, Congress enacted
the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act in 1958.29 As with fur
products, the Textile Fiber Products Act seeks to deal with both
misbranding and false advertising. A textile fiber product is mis-
branded "if it is falsely or deceptively stamped, tagged, labeled,
invoiced, advertised, or otherwise identified." A stamp or tag must
24 S. Rep. No. 78, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 5, 1951, to accompany S. 508, explained
the objectives of the legislation:
This bill has a two-fold purpose: (1) to protect consumers and scrupulous
merchants against deception and unfair competition resulting from the mis-
branding, false or deceptive advertising, or false invoicing of fur products and
furs, and (2) to protect our domestic fur producers against unfair competition.
25 Fur Products Labeling Act § 4, 65 Stat. 177 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69b.
26 Fur Products Labeling Act § 5, 65 Stat. 178 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69c.
27 Rules and Regulations under the Fur Products Labeling Act, as amended May
15, 1961. Rules 11 and 44.
28 Fur Products Labeling Act § 3, 65 Stat. 176 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69a.
29 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-
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designate each natural or manufactured fiber "by its generic name
in order of the predominance of the weight thereof" and must give
the percentage by weight of each fiber content. The stamp or tag
must also contain the name of the manufacturer and, if imported,
the country of origin. Finally, a textile fiber is falsely or deceptively
advertised "if any disclosure or implication of fiber content is made
. . . unless the same information as that required to be shown on
the stamp, tag, . . . is contained in the . . . advertisement." But
the advertisement may contain other information not violating the
provisions of the act.3" Misbranding or false or deceptive advertising
is made unlawful and an unfair method of competition and an unfair
and deceptive act or practice in commerce. 3
THE COMMISSION'S POLICING OF ADVERTISING
The states preceded the federal government in the enactment of
legislation directed against false and misleading advertising, but with
the increasing importance of national markets, it is federal regulation
of advertising by the Federal Trade Commission which has come
to pace this effort to define the plane of competition. What the
Commission is able to accomplish is determined by the scope of its
legislative authority, by the agency's annual budget, and by the
interpretations placed on its powers by the courts. A relatively large
number of the Commission's orders directed against false advertising
are appealed to the courts, even when it is obvious that the courts
have little sympathy for those who would practice brinkmanship in
the hawking of their wares. The reason for the high incidence of
appeals to the courts lies in the fact that pending a final court ruling,
the advertising practice can be continued, often to the great profit of
the advertiser.32
30 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act. § 4, 72 Stat. 1719 (1958), 15 U.S.C.
§ 70b.
31 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act § 3, 72 Stat. 1718 (1958), 15 U.S.C.
§ 70a. See also Rules and Regulations under the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act,
effective March 3, 1960, as amended May 14, 1960, and July 26, 1960.
32 A classic case is that of Carter Products v. F.T.C., 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959).
The Commission's case against Carter Products involved unfair and deceptive acts
and practices associated with the advertising of Carter's Little Liver Pills. The Commis-
sion's original order in 1951 (47 F.T.C. 1137) was set aside on the ground that cross-
examination of a witness had been unjustifiably restricted, 201 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1953).
On certiorari, the Supreme Court instructed that the Commission be authorized to reopen
the proceeding for further evidence and a new order, 364 U.S. 327 (1953). New find-
ings were made and a new order entered in 1956 (53 F.T.C. 307), which were upheld by
the Court of Appeals, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959). Over sixteen years of litigation
were terminated with a denial of certiorari on November 9, 1959, 361 U.S. 884.
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The Commission has employed several procedures in meeting
the challenge of false and misleading advertising. Its informal pro-
ceedings have included negotiations with offending advertisers to
arrive at consent settlements to end offending practices, the drafting
of Trade Practice Conference Rules in cooperation with industry
representatives, and the issuance in recent years of Advertising Guides
which are administrative interpretations of the legal precedents
of Commission and courts applied to the facts of a particular industry
or to the practice of a particularly common and objectionable form
of advertising. The hard core of the Commission's policing of adver-
tising is accomplished through its formal proceedings wherein the
analysis of the industry's or company's practices is accompanied by
specific findings as to competitive or deceptive effects and the issuance
of mandatory cease and desist orders. In the testing of these rulings
through appeals to the courts, the legal criteria of false and misleading
advertising have been refined, but the capacity of the Commission
to issue effective orders has been somewhat compromised.
1. The Concern for Advertising
At first, the Commission treated misleading advertising as
perhaps the most prevalent form of unfair competition. The use of
advertising deceptively may be a direct form of unfair competition
or an ancillary aspect of other unfair schemes.33 The Commission's
The Commission's complaint against the advertising claims of Carter Products
covered 16 pages of printed transcript. Carter's answer was largely concerned with
averring that the Commission attributed meanings to Carter's therapeutic claims which
Carter did not intend in making the claims, that some of the advertising claims had
been abandoned, and that some were permissible trade puffery or sales talk. The ulti-
mate issue was concerned with whether the pills had any therapeutic value with respect
to the functioning of the liver or bile.
During the trial, Carter exhausted all the technical devices for delay. The Com-
mission's findings, dated October 4, 1956, set forth in twenty separate and numbered
paragraphs the false advertising claims made by Carter. In substance, the Commission
found that most of the exaggerated claims for improving one's sense of well-being,
stimulating the liver, and providing an effective remedy for constipation were false.
It found specifically that Carter's Pills have no therapeutic action with respect to the
liver or bile, that they are not based upon any principal of natural bowel mobility,
that they contain strong laxatives, that the habitual use of Carter's will actually tend
to produce irregularity, that the pills are not safe for or harmless to all individuals,
that they will not help the digestive system, etc. The Commission's order required
Carter to desist from using the word "liver" in describing its pills and from a long
series of advertising claims that had been part of the patent medicine advertising litera-
ture for two generations. The Court of Appeals found the Commission's order to be
reasonably related to the statutory objective of preventing false and misleading claims.
Carter's Pills are still marketed and still advertised.
33 See, for example, F.T.C. Annual Report, June 30, 1936, at 64-71.
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already large responsibilities for policing false advertising became a
monumental task with the enactment of the Wheeler-Lea amendments
to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938.
Currently all television networks submit commercials dissemi-
nated during one week in each month; television stations submit
scripts covering a 24-hour period four times a year. Radio stations
submit continuities for a 24-hour period every 3, 6, or 12 months, de-
pending on their size and location. Twenty-five newspapers, distrib-
uted geographically and representing metropolitan and rural areas,
and ten magazines are surveyed each week."
2. Informal Procedures
a. Consent Settlements
The Commission has always employed a consent procedure for
disposing of minor violations of law. Until 1961, when investigations
revealed that a violation had occurred through ignorance or misunder-
standing and that the offender was willing to discontinue the practice,
the Commission's staff prepared a stipulation of facts and an agree-
ment to cease and desist from the unlawful practice. The party could
then present additional facts and discuss the matter informally. If,
thereafter, the party signed the stipulation, the case was closed. All
stipulations were for the public record. In event of subsequent viola-
tion, the stipulation could be introduced in evidence in any formal
proceeding. The stipulation procedure was not available in cases of
serious violations of the trade laws: false advertising of food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics considered inherently dangerous; the sale of
highly flammable and dangerous fabrics and wearing apparel; re-
straints of competition through conspiracy or discriminatory or mo-
nopolistic practices."
34 F.T.C. Annual Report, 1961, at 30. In its Annual Report for 1939, at 138, the
Commission reported that 62.7 percent of the questioned advertising related to drug
preparations, cosmetics, health devices and contrivances, and food products, as follows:
Drugs, etc. 42.4
Cosmetics and Toiletries 10.4
Food products (including beverages) 7.8
Health devices, instruments, etc. 2.1
Commodity sales-promotion plans, with agency and employment offers 6.8
Automobile, radio, refrigerator, and other equipment lines 5.3
Correspondence courses 3.3
Other products, including apparel, tobacco products, pet breeding, poultry
raising, gasoline and lubricants, specialty building materials, etc. 21.9
100.0
35 In 1960, the last year for which data were published, the Commission approved
103 stipulations, a majority of which were concerned with deceptive advertising: 15
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The Rules of Practice, Procedures and Organization of June, 1962,
provide a consent order procedure, but make no mention of stipula-
tions. Where time and the public interest permit, the Commission gives
notification of its intent to issue a complaint, accompanied by the
proposed complaint and an order. The party has ten days in which
to decide to accept a consent order, and an executed agreement em-
bodying the order must be submitted to the Commission within thirty
days. The order may contain a statement that it is for settlement pur-
poses and does not constitute an admission of guilt. The Commission
may accept the agreement and issue its complaint and decision, in-
cluding the order agreed upon, or it may reject the agreement, issue its
complaint, and set the matter down for adjudication.
b. Trade Practice Conference Rules
The Commission has used the trade practice conference as a
device to obtain industry-wide voluntary compliance with the laws
which it administers. It represents a cooperative undertaking by the
Commission and the members of an industry to draw up a code of
conduct for the industry. A proposal for a trade practice conference
may come from members of an industry or it may originate with the
Commission. The Commission authorizes a conference when it foresees
an opportunity to advance the observance of sound competitive
principles in an industry, or when there is an opportunity to secure
more adequate or equitable law obserVance, or when it appears to
be otherwise in the public interest.
All members of an industry are notified of a trade practice con-
ference and invited to attend for the purpose of making suggestions
and discussing proposed rules. Thereafter a draft of the proposed
rules is prepared by the Commission's Division of Trade Practice
Conferences. The draft is mailed to all members of the industry and
is released to the public with notice of a public hearing in the Federal
Register. Members of the industry and the general public are invited
to appear at the public hearing or to submit any comments in writing.
The final rules are then prepared for approval and promulgation by
the Commission. The Trade Practice Rules fall into two classes:
those which define practices which the Commission considers to be
violative of law, and those which reflect the industry's views as to
desirable or undesirable practices. Compliance with the Trade Prac-
concerned guarantees of appliances and other products; 3 involved arthritis or rheumatism
remedies; 8 related to deceptive pricing claims; 23 covered misbranding, false invoices and
false advertising of fur products; 15 related to wool products. F.T.C. Annual Report,
1960, at 90-92.
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tice Rules is sought on a voluntary basis, but if necessary, the Com-
mission may proceed with formal complaints.36
As of June 30, 1961, trade practice rules were in effect for 162
industries. During the year, the Commission's staff disposed of 513
rule compliance matters and 286 rule interpretations. Much of this
work involves conferences with various trades and industries relating
to advertising practices.
3 7
c. Advertising Guides
On September 15, 1955, the issuance of the Cigarette Advertising
Guides inaugurated a new program to promote voluntary compliance
with the Commission's standards of advertising. The proceedings for
the adoption of guides were initiated by a Commission directive,
accomplished through inviting comments from interested parties, and
adopted after a study of the applicable legal precedents and a
consideration of all suggestions and comments received.38 In the
Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, the Commission set forth the
principles which it considers controlling with respect to administering
the laws against false advertising:
1. Advertisements must be considered in their entirety and as
they would be read by those to whom they appeal.
2. Advertisements as a whole may be misleading although every
sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be
because things are omitted that should be said, or because
advertisements are composed or purposely printed in such way
as to mislead.
3. Advertisements are not intended to be carefully dissected with
a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an impression
upon prospective purchasers.
4. Whether or not the advertiser knows the representations to
be false, the deception of purchasers and the diversion of trade
from competitors is the same.
5. A deliberate effort to deceive is not necessary to make out a
case of using unfair methods of competition or unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices within the prohibition of the statute.
6. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.
7. Pricing representations, however made, which are ambiguous
will be read favorably to the accomplishment of the purpose
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, which is to
prevent the making of claims which have the tendency and
capacity to mislead.39
36 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.21-2.30.
37 F.T.C. Annual Report, 1961, at 64-65.
38 Tire Advertising Guides, adopted May 20, 1958, Fed. Reg., May 29, 1958.
39 Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, adopted October 2, 1958.
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The Cigarette Advertising Guides are credited with facilitating
the elimination of some 62 questionable claims involving 30 different
brands of cigarettes, the most notable being the discontinuance of
all "tar and nicotine" claims by the leading manufacturers. 40 The
Tire Advertising Guides were considered particularly helpful with
respect to the marketing of retreaded tires.41 The Guides Against
Deceptive Pricing provided an instrument for promoting easier and
wider compliance on industry- and area-wide bases. The Guides
Against Bait Advertising, adopted October 2, 1958, provide con-
sumers with a ready means for identifying schemes which involve
advertising a popular product at a sensationally low price to attract
customers into a store so that they can be switched to higher
priced products or unknown brands. The Guides Against Deceptive
Advertising of Guarantees 42 informs the advertiser of the standards
of precise disclosure which he must observe. The recently intensified
advertising campaign to encourage individuals to provide their own
shelters against atomic attack has brought the issuance of Guides
for Advertising Fallout Shelters.4' Guides for Advertising Allowances
deals with a frequent and troublesome source of complaints under the
Robinson-Patman Act.
The advertising guides serve a dual purpose of providing
guidance for those members of the industry who wish to comply with
recognized legal standards and providing consumers with the means
of recognizing and avoiding deceptive sales appeals. Their effective-
ness depends upon the fact that the Guides give notice to industry
and commerce of the criteria which are currently being used by the
Commission and its staff in evaluating advertising claims and issuing
formal complaints.
3. Formal Proceedings
The Commission's formal proceedings constitute the foundation
of its work in mitigating the evils of false advertising. The formal
cases provide the occasion for the analysis of industry practices and
of economic effects of various false advertising gambits on competition
and on consumers. New deceptive schemes are constantly being
devised; old evils appear in slightly modified guise in other industries;
the task of police surveillance is endless. Most of the Commission's
new rulings are challenged in the courts. Indeed many well-established
principles of trade regulation respecting advertising are challenged
40 F.T.C. Annual Report, 1960, at 82.
41 Ibid.
42 Adopted April 26, 1960.
43 Adopted December 5, 1961.
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again and again as advertisers seek, by appeal and other delaying
tactics, to extend the time during which they may profit by the
dubious practice.
It would be quite impossible, even as a statistical exercise, to
give a meaningful survey of all of the Commission's advertising
cases. In the fifty-odd volumes of Federal Trade Commission deci-
sions, some seventy percent of the cases are concerned with unfair
and deceptive practices, and of this number, a large proportion
involve some form of false advertising. Both the working principles
of the Commission and the legal criteria of the courts will be
adequately considered if analysis focuses principally on appeals which
have been carried to the courts.
While it has sought to exercise some critical judgment in the
selection of cases to be brought, the Commission has also endeavored
to act on all complaints received either from industry or from con-
sumers. Where administrative preference is exercised, the selection
may involve considerations of the importance of the commodity or
trade involved and the seriousness of the charge with respect to
false advertising. The important charges relating to unlawful adver-
tising practices include misrepresentation or deception respecting the
content of the product, its quality, quantity, price, place of origin
or the commodity's trade name, the use of endorsements or testi-
monials, misbranding and mislabeling, and simulation of competitors'
products. The more important products which are considered worthy
of first attention include foods, drugs, cosmetics and health devices
(particularly if the item is potentially dangerous or is presented with
fraudulent claims), wearing apparel (notably fabrics, furs, and foot-
wear), household furnishings and appliances, building materials, hy-
gienic products (soap, dentifrices, toilet preparations), animal medici-
nal preparations, correspondence courses (especially with appeals to
veterans), automobile repair parts and accessories, optical supplies,
agricultural supplies, animal foods, and school supplies. The less
important products include such items as hair and scalp preparations,
photographs and photographic equipment and supplies, jewelry,
gasoline additives, radio and television accessories and repairs,
antifreeze preparations, sporting goods, drycleaning fluids, and in-
secticides and mothproofing chemicals.
The issues have changed and evolved with successive modifica-
tions of the legislation under which the Commission works. Until
1938, the Commission was able to attack false advertising only as it
came within the scope of "unfair methods of competition" as
recognized by the courts. After the Wheeler-Lea amendments, the
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Commission has more commonly charged "unfair and deceptive
practices," thereby avoiding the necessity as a matter of proof of
establishing the scope of competition and showing that competitors
or competition have been injured. Even with the more specific
statutory prohibitions applicable to foods, drugs, cosmetics and thera-
peutic devices, or to wools, furs and textiles, the Commission has
commonly charged both a violation of the specific statute and a
violation of section 5's mandate against "unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair and deceptive practices in commerce." There have
also been significant changes in trial practice, in the proofs adduced
and in the quantum of evidence introduced as the courts have come
to interpret more literally the statutory instruction that "the find-
ings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive," showing more respect for the Commission's
expertise in weighing the evidence and drawing conclusions therefrom.
44
a. The Varied Design of Advertising Deceptions
The design of advertising deceptions exhibits changing detail
woven to the dictates of a few recurring themes. The legends change
to meet the susceptibilities of a new age, but the plot employs a few
well-tested rubrics to accomplish the separation of the credulous
from his money. The more it changes, the more false advertising is
the same-in its appeals to human weaknesses, in its distortion of
the flow of trade, in its ultimate destruction of public faith in the
merchant and his wares and his advertising. The variations on these
ancient themes are examined in representative cases wherein the
courts have supported or admonished the Commission.
1. Business Status or Connection
Businesses, like individuals, are "status seekers." Jobbers rep-
resent themselves as "manufacturers," converters are titled "mills,"
retailers masquerade as wholesalers, and unknown or little-known
distributors borrow the names-and hopefully the reputation-of
established and favorably known corporations. The fact that these
things are done testifies to the faith of their practitioners that the
deceptions, if successful, bring commercial advantage and pay off in
larger sales. The objective is always "unfair competition" although
the perpetrator may never identify, even to himself, the competitors
of whom he seeks to take unfair advantage, and though the product
he sells is as serviceable as any other in the market.
44 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 52 Stat. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c),
amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914). See Manco Watch Strap Co., No. 7785, FTC, March 13,
1962.
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Commission and courts have agreed that misrepresentation of
business status or business connections operates to the prejudice
of competitors and of the public and constitutes an unfair method
of competition. Also, the courts have recognized that proceedings
against such misrepresentations are in the public interest. Referring
to a "milling company" which did no grinding of wheat but was en-
gaged in mixing and blending plain and self-rising flours, the Supreme
Court observed:
If consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a given article because
it was made by a particular manufacturer or class of manufacturers,
they have a right to do so, and this right cannot be satisfied by
imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one equally as
good, but having a different origin. Here the findings of the Com-
mission, supported by evidence, amply disclose that a large number
of buyers, comprising consumers and dealers, believe that the
price or quality or both are affected to their advantage by the fact
that the article is prepared by the original grinder of the grain.
The result of respondents' acts is that such purchasers are deceived
into purchasing an article which they do not wish or intend to buy,
and which they might not buy if correctly informed as to its origin.
We are of the opinion that the purchasing public is entitled to
be protected against that species of deception, and that its interest
in such protection is specific and substantial. 45
Similarly, the Commission has been upheld in denominating
unfair competition the use of the word "mill" by a jobber and whole-
saler of upholstering fabrics and supplies46 and the use of "manu-
facturing" in the corporate title of a converter of textiles.47
The use of the words "civil service" and "bureau" by a corres-
pondence school was held to be unfair competition in implying a
connection with the government.48
The inclusion of the words "Army and Navy" in the title of a
retailer was ruled unfair where the goods purchased from Army and
Navy departments had declined to 10 percent of the total inventory; 49
and the title "United States Navy Weekly" was ordered discontinued
by a publication having no official connection with the United States
Navy."' In parallel situations, a supplier of salt blocks for livestock
was found to be engaged in false advertising in representing the
45 F.T.C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-217 (1933). See also F.T.C. v.
Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1928); F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483,
492-494 (1922); Ohio Leather Co. v. F.T.C., 45 F.2d 39, 41 (6th Cir. 1930).
46 F.T.C. v. Mid West Mills, 90 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1937).
47 Bear Mill Manufacturing Co. v. F.T.C., 98 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1938).
48 F.T.C. v. Civil Service Training Bureau, 79 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1935).
49 F.T.C. v. Army and Navy Trading Co., 88 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
50 United States Navy Weekly v. F.T.C., 207 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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product as endorsed by the Quartermaster's Department of the
Army.51 A retailer of jewelry was found to be falsely representing
itself as a "wholesaler," 52 and a cease and desist against a mail-order
seller of farm supplies featuring "factory to consumer" statements
in its catalogue was upheld."
The obvious and usual remedy in such cases is an order requiring
the excision of the deceptive word or words, but where such an order
would require a revision in a corporate title long in use, the courts
have sometimes considered that remedy too harsh. Cases have then
been remanded to the Commission with instructions to consider
whether requiring proper qualifying words in immediate connection
with the corporate names would not guard against misrepresentation. 54
When the corporate title or trade name of a product involves a
seemingly deliberate misuse of a name, the courts have shown little
concern to safeguard any values accruing to the offender. Thus, an
imitative and confusing use of "Juvenile," along with a design closely
resembling the registered trademark of another corporation, brought
an order to cease.55 The use of the word "lighthouse" in a corporate
title was prohibited along with a misrepresentation of the company
as "sole distributors of the Chicago Lighthouse."56 Passing-off rugs
as "Wilton" rugs is an example of the oldest form of misrepresenta-
51 Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. F.T.C., 285 Fed. 853 (2d Cir. 1922).
52 L. & C. Mayers Co. v. F.T.C., 97 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1938).
53 Brown Fence & Wire Co. v. F.T.C., 64 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1933).
54 "Although we sustain the Commission in its findings and conclusions to the
effect that the use of the trade names in question and the misstatements referred to
constitute unfair methods of competition within the meaning of the act, and that its
proceeding was in the interest of the public, we think under the circumstances the
Commission went too far in ordering what amounts to a suppression of trade names.
These names have been long in use, in one instance beginning as early as 1902. They
constitute valuable business assets in the nature of good will, the destruction of which
probably would be highly injurious and should not be ordered if less drastic means
will accomplish the same result. The orders should go no further than is reasonably
necessary to correct the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and public; and
this can be done, in the respect under consideration, by requiring proper qualifying
words to be used in immediate connection with the names." F.T.C. v. Royal Milling
Co., supra note 45, at 217. See also F.T.C. v. Mid West Mills, supra note 46; Bear Mill
Manufacturing Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 47; Educators Association v. F.T.C., 108 F.2d
470 (2d Cir. 1939) and 118 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1941). But see Herzfeld v. F.T.C., 140
F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944); Goodman v. F.T.C., 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
55 Juvenile Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 289 Fed. 57 (9th Cir. 1923).
56 Lighthouse Rug Co. v. F.T.C., 35 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1929). The Company had
purchased and resold rugs for the Chicago Lighthouse until October 1926 when it
began manufacturing identical rugs with sighted employees and competing with the
institution for the blind.
[Vol. 23
FALSE ADVERTISING
tion.57 But a pseudo passing-off may occur with the use of an estab-
lished name for articles not produced by the well-known manu-
facturer.5 Similarly, the Commission ordered the discontinuance of
the use of the name "Remington" for radio receiving sets,"9 the
application of the proper names "Elgin," "Underwood," and "Reming-
ton" to a variety of products not manufactured by those established
companies,60 and "Waltham" for inexpensive pen points.61 Likewise,
the use of the word "Westinghouse" in connection with the advertising
of an electric appliance, where the Westinghouse Corporation had
furnished only a small component, was held to warrant an order by
the Commission.'
2. The Characteristics of the Product
Much false advertising is concerned with the qualities of the
product-its identity, its contents, its capacity or performance, its
source or foreign origin, and the like.
Lumber is a product that is easily misrepresented to the public.
The Commission was, therefore, upheld in its order forbidding the
use of the designation "Philippine mahogany" for a wood imported
from the Philippine Islands which did not belong to the botanical
family of mahoganies and which did not have the technical character-
istics of true mahogany woods.6" On further consideration in later
cases, however, the Commission concluded that the term "Philippine
mahogany" had indeed acquired a secondary meaning which per-
mitted its use without inducing unfair competition.64 Such was not
57 F.T.C. v. Artloom Corp., 69 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1934).
68 Manufacturers of automotive and metal specialities, including spark plug cable
sets, undertook to market their products under the "Champion" designation, without
the consent of the Champion Spark Plug Co. F.T.C. v. Real Products Corp., 90 F.2d
617 (2d Cir. 1937).
In a private suit, a manufacturer of the spark plugs used as original equipment in
Ford cars was successful in enjoining the sale by a chain store of spark plugs manu-
factured by another firm and marketed in cartons bearing the legends "standard spark
plugs for Fords," "Ford plugs," etc. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,
3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1925).
59 Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. F.T.C., 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941).
60 Glater v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1951).
61 C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 197 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1952).
62 Niresk Industries v. F.T.C., 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
883 (1960).
63 Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. F.T.C., 26 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1928). Although
the court affirmed the order, Judge Swan was of the opinion that the word "Philippine
mahogany," used in its commercial, as distinguished from its botanical, sense was justi-
fiable, but "in view of the Commission's findings, the court is powerless."
64 Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. F.T.C., 58 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1932).
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the situation with the use of "California white pine" to designate
western yellow pine (Pinus ponderosa). There the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court to uphold the Commission's original order.!5
The featuring of ingredients which are present in insufficient
quantities to affect the performance of a product has been ruled to
be unfair competition in such instances as "Naptha Soap,"6 the
designation of an analgesic ointment as "Aspirub,' 67 or the inclusion
on a label of the legend "Dr. Caldwell's syrup pepsin combined with
laxative senna compound." 8 The Commission has likewise issued
orders against the use of fruit names to describe drinks using artifi-
cial fruit flavors. 9
A label may have the capacity to deceive because it does not
fully disclose the nature of the product, where the product, in
packaging and appearance, resembles other products. This is the
situation with respect to reclaimed and reprocessed motor oils. Even
where a producer of such oils has marked his cans plainly "Reproc-
essed Oil," the Commission has required affirmative disclosure that
the oil is re-refined from used motor oil.70
Trade names are commonly variant spellings of common names
that serve to associate the product in the buyer's mind not only with
the seller but also with certain favorable qualities of the product.
Such trade names may have a capacity to deceive, and where such
is the case, their use may be forbidden as unfair competition or as
65 F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934), reversing Algoma Lumber
Co. v. F.T.C., 64 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1933).
66 The Commission found that Procter & Gamble's soaps advertised as "P & G,
The White Naptha Soap," "Naptha Soap Chips," and "Star Naptha Washing Powder"
contained kerosene as the petroleum distillate and that the products contained less than
one-half of one percent of naptha, an amount insufficient to be effective as a cleansing
ingredient. The court agreed with the Commission that the labeling and advertising
constituted unfair competition, but held that since naptha is a volatile product, the
Commission's order requiring more than one percent by weight of naptha at the time
the soap was sold to the public was impossible of performance "unless an unreasonably
large amount of naptha is used in their manufacture." It therefore modified the Com-
mission's order to require the specified amount at the time of manufacture. Procter
& Gamble Co. v. F.T.C., 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1926).
67 Justin Haynes & Co. v. F.T.C., 105 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1939). The Commission
found that the aspirin was present only in negligible amount and that it is not absorbed
into the body through the skin.
68 Dr. W. B. Caldwell v. F.T.C., 111 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1940).
69 F.T.C. v. Morrissey, 47 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1931); F.T.C. v. Good-Grape Co.,
45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930).
70 Royal Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959). See also Mohawk
Refining Corp. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959); Double Eagle Refining Co. v.
F.T.C., 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
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an unfair or deceptive practice. Of "Duraleather," an imitation or
artificial leather sold to manufacturers of automobiles, trunks and
suit cases, the court, in upholding the Commission's order, remarked:
We are of the opinion that petitioners' trade name . .. "Dura-
leather" . . is inherently false; that it has the capacity and tend-
ency to deceive the ultimate purchasers of goods made from the
imitation leather marked, advertised, and marketed under such
trade name into the belief that such goods are made of genuine
leather.71
But a Commission order directed against using the trade name
"Kaffor-Kid" on calfskin leathers was vacated where it appeared that
others were using "kid" to describe leather not made from the hides
of goats and where there was no evidence that manufacturers pur-
chasing the leather were ever deceived. 2 And despite the Commission's
findings and orders, an advertiser of "White Shellac" and "Orange
Shellac" which was not composed solely of genuine shellac gum
was allowed to continue with his labels and advertising if the chal-
lenged trade names were accompanied by a legend such as "shellac
substitute" or "imitation shellac" and a statement that the product
is not 100 percent shellac. 7
Cigar smokers, however, were protected from deception involved
in the application of the word "Havana" to cigars containing no
Cuban tobacco, even though some manufactures were using an ex-
planatory phrase "domestic filler--domestic wrapper. '74 "Sani-Onyx,
A Vitreous Marble" was disallowed in the advertising of a product
fabricated chiefly from silica,7 and "Porcenamel" was found to be
misleading for awning products coated with an organic plastic resin
rather than porcelain enamel.7
An order against misrepresenting cooking utensils was upheld
where the utensils bearing the trade name "Silver Seal" and having the
appearance of silver or aluminum were represented as being superior
to aluminum or granite utensils; such representations could reason-
ably be understood to indicate that the utensils contained silver
which made them superior. Combs composed of a non-vulcanized
71 Masland Duraleather Co. v. F.T.C., 34 F.2d 733, 737 (3d Cir. 1929).
72 Ohio Leather Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 45.
73 F.T.C. v. Cassoff, 38 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1930).
74 H. N. Heusner & Son v. F.T.C., 106 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1939); El Moro Cigar
Co. v. F.T.C., 107 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1939).
"5 Marietta Manufacturing Co. v. F.T.C., 50 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1931). This was a
registered trade name.
76 Arrow Metal Products Corp. v. F.T.C., 249 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1957).
77 Century Metalcraft Corp. v. F.T.C., 112 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1940). Since the
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product (the composition was 13 percent rubber, 85 percent resin, and
2 percent other ingredients) could not be labeled "rubber," "hard
rubber," or after the Commission's order, "rubber-resin.""
"Segal Pick-Proof," advertised with the slogan, "The only lock
cylinder that it is impossible to pick," was held to be a deceptive
trade name when two witnesses demonstrated to the examiner in
camera their ability to pick the locks.79 "Gold Tone Studios, Inc."
was ruled an improper name for a company that did not finish its
photographs by the gold tone process.80
Trade names are often valuable commercial assets, and where
possible without continuing a deception, the courts have sought to
preserve these values. An overcoat fabric containing a combination
of alpaca, mohair, and wool fibers but no vicuna, had been successfully
sold for many years under the trade name "Alpacuna." The lower
court upheld the Commission's finding that the trade name had the
capacity to deceive but expressed regret that it did not have the power
to modify the Commission's order which required discontinuance of
the name.8 On review the Supreme Court noted that, while the
matter was one initially and primarily for the Commission, the review-
ing court did have the power to modify a Commission order. It
therefore ordered the case remanded to the Commission for considera-
tion whether "appropriate qualifying words" might not "eliminate
any deception lurking in the trade name. '8 2 On remand to reconsider
the trade name, "Cashmora," accompanied by the legends "30%
Angora rabbit-70% lamb's wool" and "No Cashmere" for sweaters
containing no cashmere, the Commission found the name still deceptive
to a portion of the public and renewed its order.83
A label with its legends may perform the same function as a
trade name in keeping consumers loyal to a product. For 60 years
prior to September, 1919, "Doctor Price's Cream Baking Powder"
had been marketed as a cream of tartar baking powder, extensively
advertised as superior in healthfulness to competing baking powders
containing phosphate or alum or both. Then the rising price of cream
complaint had not alleged that the use of the trade name "Silver Seal" was deceptive,
the company was allowed to continue to use the name.
78 United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 178 F. Supp. 723 (ED. Pa.
1959). The Commission won a summary judgment for violation of its order.
79 Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944).
80 Gold Tone Studios, Inc. v. F.T.C., 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950).
81 Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1944).
82 327 U.S. 608 (1946). The Commission modified its order, 43 F.T.C. 256.
83 Elliott Knitwear v. F.T.C., 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); Elliott Import Corp.,
No. 6637, FTC, Oct. 24, 1961.
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of tartar prompted Royal Baking Powder Company to convert to
a phosphate baking powder. It continued at first to use the old labels
with an overstamp, and then developed new labels so similar in design
and phrasing that, in the judgment of the Commission, purchasers
were likely to be deceived into believing they were continuing to
receive the same product.
s4
"Sectional overlay" is a "quality mark" which indicates that
silverware has been reinforced at the points of wear; it is indicative
of "additional value and increased use and permanency of the article."
To apply the term to all pieces in a silver set where the ornamental
pieces are not "sectionally overlaid" is unfair competition. 5
Trademarks, though registered, have no better standing than
trade names when they are used to practice deception."6 The registra-
tion of a trademark gives "no unlimited sanction to use it when it
would deceive"; 7 it "is not a license to engage in unfair competi-
tion."' ' And the trademark, if deceptive, is not saved by caling
it simply a "boastful and fanciful word."8 9
84 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). In upholding
the Commission's order, the court stated, at page 753:
The novelty of the present case lies in the fact that the manufacturer is
passing off one of his products for another of his own products, and the basis
of this proceeding is the deception of the public ...
*. . The method of advertising adopted by the Royal Baking Powder Co.
to sell under the name of Dr. Price's Cream Baking Powder an inferior powder,
on the strength of the reputation attained through 70 years of its manufacture
and sale and wide advertising of its superior powder, under an impression
induced by its advertisements that the product purchased was the same in kind
and as superior as that which had been so long manufactured by it, was unfair
alike to the public and to the competitors in the baking powder business ...
85 National Silver Co. v. F.T.C., 88 F.2d 425, 427-428 (2d Cir. 1937).
86 F.T.C. v. Kay, 35 F.2d 160, 162 (7th Cir. 1929): "Assuming that respondent has
registered his trade-mark as above indicated, the test of his methods of competition is,
not whether a trade-mark may have been registered, but whether his methods fall
within the condemnation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares 'unfair
methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful'."
87 N. Fluegelman & Co. v. F.T.C., 37 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1930).
88 Irwin v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 316, 325 (8th Cir. 1944); F.T.C. v. Real Products
Corp., supra note 58.
89 Charles of the Ritz v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944):
Next, and as the crux of its appeal, petitioner attacks the propriety of the
finding that by use of the trade-mark "Rejuvenescence" it has represented that
its preparation will rejuvenate and restore the appearance of youth to the
skin .... On the contrary, the Commission's expert and practicing dermatologist
testified directly that rejuvenescence still meant not only to him, but also, as far
as he knew, to his female patients, the restoration of youth. In the light of
this plain meaning, petitioner's contention can hardly be sustained that "re-
juvenescence" is a nondeceptive "boastful and fanciful word," utilized solely for
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Pictures as well as words can be deceptive. However, when a
picture used in a trademark showed a cotton mattress with one corner
flaired open, so that a 3-to-6 inch mattress would have expanded to
35 inches, the Commission was not allowed the enforcement of a
cease and desist order denying the company the right to continue
to use the picture in advertising or as a trademark. 0
The uninhibited use of pictorial misrepresentations has recently
been receiving the Commission's critical attention. 91 The "sandpaper
test" by which "Palmolive Rapid Shave" cream was demonstrated
"to prove Rapid Shave's super moisturizing power" employed not
sandpaper but a sheet of plexiglass to which sand had been applied.
In announcing its cease and desist order against Colgate-Palmolive
Co. and its advertising agency, Ted Bates & Co., the Commission
commented on the use of spurious mockups or demonstrations on
teleigsion:
The limitations of the [television] medium may present a challenge
to the creative ingenuity of copywriters; but surely they do not
constitute lawful justification for resort to falsehoods and decep-
tions of the public. The argument to the contrary would seem to be
based on the wholly untenable assumption that the primary or
dominant function of television is to sell goods, and that the
Commission should not make any rulings which would impair the
ability of sponsors and agencies to use television with maximum
effectiveness as a sales or advertising medium.
Stripped of polite verbiage, the argument boils down to this:
Where truth and television salesmanship collide, the former must
give way to the latter. This is obviously an indefensible proposition.
The notion that a sponsor may take liberties with the truth in its
television advertising, while advertising using other media must
continue to be truthful, is patent nonsense. The statutory require-
ments of truth in advertising apply to television no less than to
other media of communication.92
False advertising is involved when the source from which a
product comes is misrepresented. Corned beef hash and deviled ham
its attractiveness as a trade-mark. That the Patent Office has registered
"Rejuvenescence" as a trade-mark is not controlling. Even conceding its non-
descriptive quality and hence its validity as a trade-mark-a concession suffi-
ciently doubtful in itself to be made only arguendo-the fact of registration
does not prevent its use from falling within the prohibition of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
90 Ostermoor & Co. v. F.T.C., 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
91 Standard Brands, No. 7737, FTC, June 1, 1960; Eversharp, No. 7811, FTC, Sept.
30, 1960; Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7660, FTC, March 9, 1961; Carter Products, No.
7943, FTC, Aug. 31, 1961.
92 Colgate-Palmolive Co., Ted Bates & Co., F.T.C. No. 7736, FTC, January 4, 1962.
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packed from the meat of cattle or hogs not grown in Virginia could
not, in the view of the Commission, be sold under the label "Virginia,"
even though the labels had been approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture under the Meat Inspection Act. But where the distributor
acquired substantial stock interests in licensed packers, it qualified
as a packer under the Packers and Stockyards Act, and the Commis-
sion lost jurisdiction to impose an order. 3 The use of "New River"
in corporate name and trade name by a coal company marketing
coal from another region is unfair competition,94 and "Scout" cannot
be placed on a knife that is not distributed by the Boy Scouts of
America?9
Attempts to glamorize products by attributing to them a foreign
origin is a recurring malpractice among sellers of perfume and other
toiletries. Sometimes the deception covers a product of wholly
domestic origin; 9 sometimes the ingredients, or some of them, are
imported, but the final product is compounded in this country.
There may be no affirmative statement of foreign origin, but the use
of foreign words and phrases may nevertheless deceive the public.
9 7
It is equally a deceptive practice to fail to disclose the foreign origin
of products,"3 or to imply an untruthful foreign originY9
Outside of the fields of cosmetics and medicinal preparations,
there are relatively few court decisions on false advertising that turn
on the performance characteristics of the falsely advertised products.
An overly optimistic statement of the capacity of a shortwave radio
to receive foreign broadcasts brought a cease and desist order,"°
as did exaggerated claims about the success of waterproofing com-
pounds for masonry walls.10' But the court differed with the Com-
mission about the significance of the protection afforded by motor oil
containing colloidal graphite when the oil supply in an engine is
depleted.102 However, when books are republished, in this instance
93 United Corp. v. F.T.C., 110 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1940). A Working Agreement
of June 4, 1954, between the Food and Drug Administration and the Commission pro-
vides for avoidance of duplication of activities.
94 F.T.C. v. Walker's New River Mining Co., 79 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1935).
95 Adolph Kastor & Bros. v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1943).
96 F.T.C. v. Balme, supra note 45.
97 Harsam Distributors v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959); Houbigant, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 139 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944); Establissements Rigaud v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 590
(2d Cir. 1942); Fioret Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 100 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1938).
98 Segal v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1944).
99 Edward P. Paul & Co. v. F.T.C., 169 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
100 Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944).
101 Concrete Materials Corp. v. F.T.C., 189 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1951); Prima
Products v. F.T.C., 209 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1954).
102 Kidder Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 17 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941).
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as paperbacks, they should show the original titles and indicate
clearly if they are abridged. 0 3
Woolen products were a problem before the Commission had
the strong and specific authority of the Wool Products Labeling Act
of 19390 to support its orders. A Commission order to end unfair
competition through labeling and advertising part-wool underwear
as "Natural Merino," "Wool," "Natural Wool," and the like was re-
versed by the lower court, which could not find any injury to competi-
tion." 5 The Supreme Court, however, found that the labels were
literally false and deceptive to the purchasing public and that this con-
stituted "an unfair method of competition as against manufacturers of
all-wool knit underwear and as against those manufacturers of mixed
wool and cotton underwear who brand their product truthfully. For
when misbranded goods attract customers by means of a fraud which
they perpetrate, trade is diverted from the producer of truthfully
marked goods."' 6
The synthetic textiles have also presented difficulties for con-
sumers unable always to distinguish silk from rayon. The public
interest in resolving this confusion was held to justify a Commission
order requiring a manufacturer to label rayon products as rayon,
"thus preventing distributors from exercising a deception of which
the petitioners themselves were not guilty."'0 7 The larger possibilities
of confusion in the multiplication of trade names for man-made
textile fibers was responsible for the enactment of the Textile Fiber
Products Identification Act,' and for the Commission's rules and
regulations enforcing the use of generic names, while still permitting
nondeceptive trademarks.'"
False advertising with respect to furs has been under double
attack: to secure accurate designations of the kinds of fur in adver-
tising and on labels, and to bring some truth into the pricing of fur
products. The Fur Products Labeling Act"0 strengthened the Com-
103 Bantam Books v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1960).
104 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j.
105 Winsted Hosiery Co. v. F.T.C., 272 Fed. 957 (2d Cir. 1921).
106 F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., supra note 45, at 493. In a section 5 case, an
advertiser was ordered to cease referring to materials as "wool" and "reprocessed wool"
unless the materials are as defined in the Wool Products Labeling Act. Henry Modell &
Co., 47 F.T.C. 1329 (1951).
107 Mary Muffet v. F.T.C., 194 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1952).
108 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 70-70k.
109 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act. § 4, 72 Stat. 1719 (1958), is U.S.C.
§ 70b. See Courtaulds v. Kintner, 182 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1960).
110 Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j.
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mission's mandate to deal with all forms of misrepresentation. The
Commission's Rule 44 is directed against any deceptive claims as to
values, savings represented by sale prices, and the like. When this
authority was challenged, the lower court agreed with the Commission
that the law's "intention was to reach all misrepresentations in ad-
vertising, including those relating to prices and value,""' but it did
not support the Commission in interpreting "invoice" requirements
to apply to sales slips at the retail level. In the matter of invoice
requirements, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission, noting that
"the 'invoice' is the only permanent record of the transaction that
the retail purchaser has" and that, as the Commission emphasized,
"the invoice may serve as a documentary link connecting the sale of
specific fur products back through the retailer's records with adver-
tisements therefor ....
A special statutory standard defines false advertising of oleo-
margarine to include any representation that margarine is a dairy
product." 3 The Commission found that advertisements of "Farm
Queen" margarine which used such expressions as "churned to delicate,
sweet creamy goodness," "country fresh," and "the same day-to-day
freshness which characterizes our other dairy products,!' violated the
special statutory standard, and this was upheld upon review. 114
3. Deceptive Pricing
The first Federal Trade Commission case to reach the courts
involved false advertising with respect to prices. Sears Roebuck &
Co. advertised that it could sell sugar at "less than wholesale prices"
because of its large volume and quick turnover, and that it could sell
teas and coffees at lower prices by buying direct and cutting out
middlemen's profits. Since the facts were that it was selling sugar as
a loss leader and that it purchased most of its teas and all of its
coffees from importers and wholesalers in this country, the Commission
found that the false advertising constituted unfair competition.115
Fictitious and deceptive pricing is probably the most prevalent
form of false advertising. It is perhaps the most serious present threat
to public confidence in advertising. It is also serious in its competi-
111 Mandel Brothers v. F.T.C., 254 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1958). See also DeGorter
v. F.T.C., 244 F.2d 270, 282-283 (9th Cir. 1957).
112 F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 390-391 (1959).
113 Public Law No. 459, 81st Congress, 64 Stat. 21 (1950), added Section 15(a) (2),
15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (2), to the Federal Trade Commission Act.
114 E. F. Drew & Co. v. F.T.C., 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Reddi-Spred
Corp. v. F.T.C., 229 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1956).
115 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. F.T.C., 258 Fed. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
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tive effects because price is a material consideration in determining
what sellers will get the business.
Fictitious pricing takes many forms, but all are intended to
persuade the buyer that he has the opportunity to buy at a saving." 6
The Guides Against Deceptive Pricing set forth, with illustrative
details, the most common forms of false advertising respecting price.
Savings claims from established retail prices are justified only if they
apply to a specific article, and the saving is a reduction from the
usual price of the article in the area or from the advertiser's customary
price in the recent regular course of business; any such advertisement
must specify which facts apply. Where savings are advertised in
relation to similar and comparable products, the advertising must
clearly disclose that the savings are claimed on this basis, and the
compared products must be of like quality and generally available at
the comparative price in the same trade area. "Special sales" should
not be advertised unless the advertised prices are in fact reductions
as specified from the usual and customary prices. "Factory or
wholesale prices" may not be advertised unless the prices available
to purchasers are the same as those at which retailers regularly buy."
"Pre-ticketing" involves deceptive pricing if the price shown
exceeds the price at which the article is usually and customarily sold
in the trade area. Similarly, advertising or referring to "manufacturer's
list price" or "manufacturer's suggested retail price" involves decep-
tive pricing if the "list prices" are in excess of those usually and
customarily received by retailers in the trade area.
Furs, as luxury and high-priced items, have been particularly
subject to deceptive pricing."" Automobiles were so notoriously sub-
ject to deceptive prices that special legislation was passed to require
price disclosures. 119 Before its enactment, automobile dealers in
many eastern cities added approximately $700 to the prices of the
popular cars in order to be able to advertise attractive trade-in
allowances.
Deceptive pricing may arise with respect to services as well as
commodities. The Commission issued cease and desist orders against
116 Thomas v. F.T.C., 116 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1940); International Art Co. v.
F.T.C., 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1940); Chicago Portrait Co. v. F.T.C., 4 F.2d 759 (7th
Cir. 1924).
117 Progress Tailoring Co. v. F.T.C., 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946).
118 See The Fair v. F.T.C., 272 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1959); Mandel Bros. v. F.T.C.,
254 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1958), and F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., supra note 112; DeGorter v.
F.T.C., supra note 111, at 282-283.
119 Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 72 Stat. 325 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-
1233.
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both General Motors and Ford in connection with their adoption and
advertisement of the "6o Plan" for financing installment sales of
automobiles. The plan, initiated by General Motors, involved such
competitive advantages that other companies were obliged to adopt
the plan. Some, but not all of the advertisements, noted that it was
not 6% interest, but simply a convenient multiple to get the unpaid
balance on the purchase price of a car. The Commission, noting that
this method involved approximately 11 2 % simple interest per annum
on the unpaid balance, found that the plan had a capacity to deceive
the public into thinking that it was paying a simple interest charge of
6% .'°
4. Bait Advertising
Bait advertising is a special form of deceptive price advertising.
Bait advertising has been defined by the Commission as "an alluring
but insincere offer to sell a product." A popular, well-known product
is advertised at an extremely low price, but the advertiser then dis-
courages the prospective buyer from considering the advertised item
and attempts to switch him to some other product at a higher price,
or on some other basis more advantageous to the advertiser. A second
form of bait advertising may involve the offer of inferior merchandise
as quality merchandise, also at extremely low prices. The advertiser
may seek to effect a switch through refusing to show or sell the
advertised product, disparaging the item, failing to have the item
available in adequate quantities, refusing to make deliveries within
a reasonable time, demonstrating a defective item, or by other devices.
Or the switch may be attempted after the prospective buyer has paid
for the advertised item. The practice, more commonly employed by
sellers of household appliances, sewing machines, and hearing aids,
has recently been reported by the Commission to have spread to the
home-improvement field.' 21
5. Free Goods
The offer of free goods is a form of price competition, and like
other pricing tactics, may involve deceptive practices.-2 The offer of
"free goods" may even involve elements of bait advertising, as when
an offer of books "free" is used to obtain leads and when the free
120 General Motors Corp. v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940); Ford Motor Co.
v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941).
121 Lifetime, Inc. and Youngstown Homes, Inc., No. 7616, FTC, Dec. 8, 1961.
122 Progress Tailoring Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 117. A Commission order re-
quired discontinuance of advertising offering salesmen accepting employment a suit of
clothes "free," when the "free" suit was given as part of the compensation for selling a
number of suits.
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books are given only in return for a signed contract for an extension
service which calls for undisclosed future payments. 2 3
The Commission twice investigated the "free" book offers of
the Book-of-the-Month Club, and twice closed the investigations with-
out prejudice. Subsequently, on January 14, 1948, the Commission
adopted and published in the Federal Register an administrative
interpretation covering the use of the word "free" in advertising.
It thereafter reopened the Book-of-the-Month case, found that the
use of the word "free" was misleading since, if a member failed to
buy four books within a year, the Club demanded payment for the
"free" book. On appeal, the court reluctantly upheld the Commission's
order.1 4
A change in the political complexion of the Commission brought
a change in policy with respect to "free" goods. 5 A new administra-
tive rule was adopted December 3, 1953, permitting the use of the word
"free," or words of similar import, in advertising and otherwise, to
describe merchandise which is not an unconditional gift but is contin-
gent on compliance with certain conditions, provided the conditions
are clearly disclosed and the merchandise is neither increased in price
nor reduced in quality or quantity. Thereafter, the Commission and a
respondent joined in a motion to vacate a final order which had been
enforced by a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals.' 26
A sharply divided Commission required a paint manufacturer
to cease advertising "Every Second Can Free of Extra Cost" where
the manufacturer sold only "in units of two" at a price of "$6.98 a
gallon" or "$2.25 a quart," since no "usual and regular price" had
ever been established. 27
123 Consolidated Book Publishers v. F.T.C., 53 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1931). Accord,
F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936), which reversed in part the
order of the Commission, whereupon the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals was
reversed in F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937):
"The practice of promising free books where no free books were intended to be
given, and the practice of deceiving unwary purchasers into the false belief that loose-
leaf supplements alone sell for $69.50, when in reality both books and supplement
regularly sell for $69.50, are practices contrary to decent business standards. To fail
to prohibit such evil practices would be to elevate deception in business and to give it
the standing and dignity of truth."
124 Book-of-the-Month Club v. F.T.C., 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953), affirming 48
F.T.C. 1297 (1952).
125 The issue was considered in Walter J. Black, No. 5571, FTC, September 11, 1953.
126 Rosenblum v. F.T.C., 214 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954). The motion granted per
curiam. The court's previous order, Rosenblum v. F.T.C., 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951)
affirming per curiam 47 F.T.C. 712 (1950); cert. denied, 343 U.S. 905 (1952).
127 Mary Carter Paint Co., No. 8290, FTC, June 28, 1962.
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6. Guarantees
Guarantees are a form of price competition that lends itself to
misleading advertising. The abuses of this form of advertising are
illustrated in the Commission's Guides Against Deceptive Advertising
of Guarantees.128
The principal deficiencies in guarantee advertising stem from a
lack of clarity and precision in stating accurately what the terms
of the guarantee are. Any guarantee must clearly disclose the identity
of the guarantor, the nature and extent of the guarantee, and the
manner in which the guarantee will be fulfilled. If the guarantee
involves a pro rata adjustment, say for the unexpired term of the
guarantee of a tire or battery, there must be an explanation of how
the adjustment will be calculated. "Satisfaction or your money back"
means a refund of the full purchase price in the absence of other
clearly stated conditions. A "lifetime" guarantee must also identify
the "life" that forms the basis for the warranty, and if any conditions
are attached, such as a service charge, it must be clearly disclosed. 2 9
"Guaranteed never to be undersold" should also state what the
guarantor will do if buyers do not realize lowest prices in purchases
from him. An advertiser should not represent that a product is
guaranteed unless he is both able and willing to perform according
to the guarantee. A guarantee must not be used to misrepresent
material facts about the product guaranteed; thus "guaranteed for
30 months" should not be used in promoting a battery that is normally
expected to, last for only 18 months.
7. Medicinal Advertising
The Federal Trade Commission's reversal in the matter of a po-
tentially dangerous "obesity cure," through failure to make adequate
findings with respect to the competitive effects of false advertising of
the remedy,1 0 provided a firm propaganda base for supporting an en-
largement of the Commission's powers to deal with false and mislead-
ing advertising. With the enactment of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments,
the Commission received the strongest statutory authority to cope
with deceptive advertising in the food, drug, cosmetic, and therapeutic
appliance fields. The need for policing such advertising is particularly
acute, for the advertisers have been notoriously unscrupulous in their
128 Adopted April 26, 1960.
129 Parker Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1946).
130 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). In a complaint based on subse-
quent violations of the same character, the Commission made painstaking findings with
respect both to deception and competitive effects and was upheld by the Supreme Court.
F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942).
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claims with respect to these products, and the average purchaser is ill
equipped to appraise critically claims respecting therapeutic values.
The foundation for the exercise of more effective control over this
class of advertising lies in the statutory definition of false advertising;
namely, advertising "which is misleading in a material respect" or
which "fails to reveal facts material" with respect to the advertising
representations or the consequences of use.131
The same statutory provision which defines false advertising also
provides a statutory defense where the advertising goes only to mem-
bers of the medical profession.132  This statutory defense is strictly
interpreted and is not available when the advertisements reach a lay
public.133
The falsities of medicinal advertising are concentrated in un-
founded curative claims. Their capacity for continuing deception lies
in the fact that the human body has remarkable recuperative powers;
most individuals would recover from their minor ailments without
any medication at all. Also many, when ill, continue other therapies
while taking the "wonder cure," and then on recovery, they tend to
credit the product that has made the most extreme claims. The dangers
of misleading medical advertising have increased in recent years.
While herb remedies and "snake oils" might not have done any good,
they also did little harm; such as not true of some of the new and
powerful drugs. And as always, there is the danger that self-medica-
tion will allow a serious condition to progress beyond control.
In attacking the touting of the remedial virtues of Capon Water'3 4
or the offer of a vitamin to assure a "shapely" figure and a restoration
131 Federal Trade Commission Act § 15(a), 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)
(1).
132 Ibid. "No advertisement of a drug shall be deemed to be false if it is dissemi-
nated only to members of the medical profession, contains no false representations of a
material fact, and includes, or is accompanied in each instance by truthful disclosure of,
the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug."
133 The defense was denied to an advertiser of a "cancer cure." "Failure to comply
with one of these prerequisites, namely, that an advertisement (1) be disseminated only
to members of the medical profession, and (2) be accompanied in each instance by
truthful disclosure of the formulae showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug,
would have deprived petitioners of the benefit of the protective provision of section
15(a). Here both of the requirements were lacking... ." Koch v. F.T.C., 206 F.2d 311,
316-317 (6th Cir. 1953).
134 Capon Water Co. v. F.T.C., 107 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1939). The mineral water,
used externally or internally, was offered as a cure for 52 named diseases, ranging from
nephritis to chronic pneumonia and from poison ivy to sterility. The Commission's mild
order required the company to restrict its advertising testimonials to those of its own
physician expertsI
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of vigor, 8' the Commission's action seemed to be primarily concerned
with protecting the consumer's pocketbook. On the other hand, the
advertising of a Gordon Detoxifier (a rectal irrigator) as a competent
treatment for purifying the blood stream, relieving the pains of
rheumatism and arthritis, reducing high blood pressure, and treating
other ailments,136 or presenting odorless garlic tablets as a remedy for
high blood pressure, 13 7 could result in delay in obtaining competent
medical attention in more serious situations.
Dentifrice advertising, with imputed testimonials and cosmetic
claims, are largely matters of consumer deception and unfair compe-
tition.133 Much more serious were claims to cures or competent treat-
ment of cancer, leprosy, infantile paralysis, diabetes, and arthritis
made for several products of Koch Laboratories. The court upheld
the Commission in rejecting the evidence of "case histories" and the
argument that therapeutic claims were matters of opinion made in good
faith.'39 The sufferings of arthritis patients offer a fertile field for
deceptive advertising. Imdrin-"Amazing new discovery for rheuma-
tism, arthritis," "Hospital tested, stops swelling, uncorks joints, con-
tains sensational new research discovery"-was found by the Com-
mission to give only limited and temporary relief from pain, the anal-
gesic effect being due to manganese salicylate and acetylsalicylic acid
(aspirin) .140 Dolcin Corporation, whose tablets contained 2.8 grains
of calcium succinate and 3.7 grains of acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin),
was required to stop advertising Dolcin tablets (1) as inexpensive, (2)
as safe when taken over long periods of time, (3) as safe when taken by
persons adversely affected by aspirin, and (4) as affording relief from
the severe aches, pains, and discomforts of arthritis and rheumatism. 141
8. Cosmetic Advertising
Cosmetics, like medicines, are a profitable field for deceptive
135 Associated Laboratories v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1945).
136 Irwin v. F.T.C., supra note 88.
137 Excelsior Laboratory v. F.T.C., 171 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1948).
138 Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950). The Commission's
desist order was directed against two advertising claims: (1) Claims that twice as many
dentists personally used Ipana as any other dentifrice and that more dentists recom-
mended Ipana for their patients than any other two dentifrices combined, and (2)
claims that Ipana possessed therapeutic and prophylactic qualities when used with
massage to impart health to the gums. The first claims rested on the returns of 621
and 461 dentists among 1983 replying to a magazine survey sent to 10,000 dentists;
Commission and court held this small sample did not warrant the sweeping claims.
130 Koch v. F.T.C., supra note 133.
140 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. F.T.C., 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953).
141 Dolcin Corp. v. F.T.C., 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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advertising; the consumer has a will to believe, even with respect to
the most extreme claims.
"Charles of the Ritz Rejuvenescence Cream'1142 was advertised
to contain "a vital organic ingredient" along with "essences and com-
pounds" so that the foundation cream brings to the user's "skin
quickly the clear radiance .. .the petal-like quality and texture of
youth" because it "restores natural moisture necessary for a live,
healthy skin"; thus it is "constantly active in keeping your skin clear,
radiant, and young looking.'1 43  The Commission's order directed
against any advertising using the word "rejuvenescence" was affirmed,
Judge Clark answering the petitioner's argument of "no deception"
with a recognition of the importance of truthful advertising of cos-
metics:
There is no merit to petitioner's argument that, since no straight-
thinking person could believe that its cream would actually rejuve-
nate, there could be no deception. Such a view results from a grave
misconception of the purposes of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. That law was not "made for the protection of experts, but for
the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous," Florence Mfg. Co. v. I. C. Dowd &
Co., 2 Cir., 178 Fed. 73, 75; and the "fact that a false statement
may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced
does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive
others less experienced." Federal Trade Commission v. Standard
Education Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116. . . .The important criterion is
the net impression which the advertisement is likely to make upon
the general populace. . . .And, while the wise and the worldly
may well realize the falsity of any representations that the present
product can roll back the years, there remains "that vast multitude"
of others who, like Ponce de Leon, still seek a perpetual fountain
of youth. As the Commission's expert further testified, the average
woman, conditioned by talk in magazines and over the radio of
"vitamins, hormones, and God knows what," might take "rejuve-
nescence" to mean that this "is one of the modern miracles" and is
"something which would actually cause her youth to be restored."
It is for this reason that the Commission may "insist upon the most
literal truthfulness" in advertisements, Moretrench Corp. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 127 F.2d 792, 795, and should have
the discretion, undisturbed by the courts, to insist if it chooses
"upon a form of advertising clear enough so that, in the words of
the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err
therein.'" General Motors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
2 Cir., 114 F.2d 33, 36, certiorari denied 312 U.S. 682.144
142 The deceptive character of the trade name has already been noted.
143 Charles of the Ritz v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 677-678 (2d Cir. 1944).
144 Id. at 679-680. See also Belmont Laboratories v. F.T.C., 103 F.2d 538 (3d
Cir. 1939).
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The prevalence of baldness among men has attracted a parade of
specialists, recently masquerading as "trichologists" although most
lack all medical training, whose advertising, subtle or blatant, promises
the prevention or cure of baldness through the use of medical and
cosmetic preparations and "clinical" treatments. These broad claims
are false and misleading, for they do not disclose that some 90 per-
cent of the baldness in men is the so-called "male pattern baldness"
for which there is no known remedy.
The Commission's recent attacks on this class of advertising have
concentrated on requiring disclosure that the advertised products will
have no value with respect to the vast preponderance of baldness
cases. 1 It is significant that the Commission has been upheld in more
broadly drafted orders which forbid the specified forms of misleading
advertising not only with respect to the particular product, but also
with respect to "any other preparations for use in the treatment of
hair and scalp conditions.'
146
9. Testimonials
The use of paid testimonials would seem to be an obvious instance
of unfair competition, with a clear capacity to deceive the unskeptical.
Even a disclosure of the fact that the testimonials are paid would not
preclude the possibility of deception; the pretense, by nondisclosure,
that they are unpaid makes the testimonial potentially more deceptive
to the unsophisticated. The argument that the testimonial is used
simply for the attention-getting value of a famous name is no defense
of the practice; indeed, it is not factually correct where the testimonial
carries the message of the advertiser. There is no more excuse for
the use of paid testimonials than any other deceptive practice. The simple
fact is that, when the advertiser pays for the good opinion of the
testimonial giver, neither the advertiser nor the public can have any
confidence in the sincerity of that opinion.
Despite these truisms, the Commission has suffered some set-
backs, as when a lower court reasoned that testimonials did not tend
to restrain trade. 47 However, the Commission has continued to attack
145 Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); Voss
Hair Experts v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1960); Ward Laboratories v. F.T.C.,
276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Erickson Hair and Scalp
Specialists v. F.T.C., 272 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1959).
146 Voss Hair Experts v. F.T.C., supra note 145; Erickson Hair and Scalp Specialists
v. F.T.C., supra note 145.
147 "The Federal Trade Commission Act . . . does not purport to establish a
decalogue of good business manners or morals .... The Commission does not suggest
that these testimonials tend to create a monopoly; they do not have a tendency to
create an undue restraint of trade. The strongest argument the respondent makes is that
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the "improper" use of testimonials such as false claims with respect
to baseball gloves and a failure to disclose that manufacturers were
paid to include Tide or Dash in their new washing machines, and it
found court support in denying the right to advertise the imputed
testimonial of "twice as many dentists" recommending a toothpaste. 14
10. Disparagement of Competing Products
If paid praise is permitted, paid disparagement-of competitors'
products-is not. The question arose in connection with the sale of
stainless steel cooking utensils. Steel cooking utensils can not be
promoted by representing that the consumption of food prepared in
aluminum utensils will cause cancer, stomach trouble, anemia, or
that essential minerals and vitamins are lost.1 49 However, the Com-
mission was powerless to stop the same disparaging statements about
aluminum cooking utensils by the author and publisher of health
pamphlets where neither author nor publisher was engaged in the
manufacture or sale of cooking utensils.'
11. Insurance Advertising
Insurance contracts are characteristically complex and difficult
for the lay reader to understand. Advertising of insurance would
therefore present some problems even if there were no competitive
inducements to make the policy's protections appear better than they
are. Thus, it is not surprising that the Federal Trade Commission has
found many instances when it has been necessary to consider insur-
ance advertising.
There is, however, much confusion as to the extent of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction over insurance company activities. The Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Insurance Act 5' provides that the antitrust acts
failure to state the price paid for the testimonial amounts to deception and misrepresenta-
tion concerning the petitioner's product and in that way the petitioner is able to deprive
honest manufacturers of a market. . . . But where the unlawful restraint of trade has
been ordered to be discontinued it has always appeared that there was some dishonesty
in labeling or marketing the goods... . In order that the Commission proceed in the
public interest, the courts have insisted not only upon a showing that the practice is
unfair and disapproved, but also that the public is misled thereby. ....
"The use of testimonials, which are truthfully stated under the signature of the
giver, cannot in any sense be regarded as unfair competition or as involving a tendency
to restrain competition unduly, and the Commission was without jurisdiction to inter-
fere." Northam Warren Corp. v. F.T.C., 59 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1932).
148 A. J. Hollander & Co., No. 8197, FTC, Jan. 3, 1962; Procter & Gamble Co.,
No. 7542, FTC, June 30, 1960; Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 138.
149 Steelco Stainless Steel v. F.T.C., 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951).
150 Scientific Manufacturing Co. v. F.T.C., 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941).
151 McCarran Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015.
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"shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law.' 52 This criterion of jurisdiction
is a practical guarantee that every exercise of Commission control will
be challenged in the courts.
The Commission's attempt to restrain unfair and deceptive ad-
vertising practices by out-of-state insurance companies was held to be
beyond its jurisdiction since the states were said to have jurisdiction
over out-of-state companies doing business within their boundaries.153
Insurance companies writing health and accident policies were un-
successful in challenging findings of deceptive advertising on the ground
that the advertising was in accord with the trade practice rules of the
Commission and had been approved by certain of the Commission's
advisory attorneys. The court noted that the complaint charged not
a violation of trade practice rules, but a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 54 However, the Supreme Court has
concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act has withdrawn the Com-
mission's authority to regulate insurance advertising, where that ad-
vertising is regulated by the state wherein it is disseminated; 155 but a
domiciliary state's laws forbidding unfair and deceptive practices will
not oust the Commission's jurisdiction where health insurance is so-
licited and sold by mail throughout the country. 6
b. The Advertiser's Defenses
The defenses advanced by advertisers fall into two classes: those
which challenge the manner in which the Commission has discharged
its responsibilities, and those which seek to defend the advertiser's
conduct. The first class of defenses involves challenges to the Com-
mission's jurisdiction, the adequacy of its findings in view of the
statutory standards, or the reasonableness of its order; these matters
are reserved for later consideration. The present section is concerned
primarily with attempts to justify or exonerate the advertising.
1. Puffing
"Puffing," as an expression of an exaggerated opinion about the
quality of a product, has always been a feature of salesmanship; in
152 McCarran Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15
U.S.C. § 1012.
153 American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957).
154 American Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. F.T.C., 255 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1958);
Automobile Owners Safety Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 255 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1958).
255 F.T.C. v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 561-563 (1958).
156 F.T.C. v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960), reversing 262 F.2d 241
(8th Cir. 1959).
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moderate measures, it is still tolerated.15' The important distinction
between tolerable puffing and misrepresentation was clearly stated in
weighing exaggerated claims respecting benefits from the use of an
insecticide spray:
Petitioner argues that the benefits set forth in the advertisements
beyond those actually derived from use of the spray are merely
trader's talk or "puffing," hence excusable. "Puffing" refers, gener-
ally, to an expression of opinion not made as a representation of
fact .... While a seller has some latitude in "puffing" his goods,
he is not authorized to misrepresent them or to assign to them
benefits or vitrues they do not possess. 158
Representations made in the form of exaggerations or superla-
tives for the purpose of inducing the purchase of products and with
the capacity to deceive cannot be excused as "puffing."' 15 9 Such mis-
representations are particularly intolerable when employed in the
promotion of drugs and therapeutic devices. 60 There is little security
for the advertiser with deceptive copy in the defense of "puffing."
2. Truth
A defense that the advertising challenged is true is usually an
argument that the advertising, critically and literally considered, does
not state a falsehood. This is not enough. The test of truth in adver-
tising is the total or net impression made on the reader, an average
member of the public.' 61 "Words and sentences may be literally and
.57 Ostermoor & Co. v. F.T.C., 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
158 Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
159 Steelco Stainless Steel v. F.T.C., supra note 149, at 697-698. See also Goodman
v. F.T.C., supra note 151, at 609.
160 Where the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's order against exag-
gerated claims for "Cuboid" shoe inserts, the Supreme Court reinstated the Commission's
order in a two-sentence per curiam decision. Sewell v. F.T.C., 240 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
In Feil v. F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879, 896-897 (9th Cir. 1960), Judge Yankwich quoted,
with emphasis, a warning about deceit and puffing:
"The skillful advertiser can mislead the consumer without misstating a single
fact. The shrewd use of exaggeration, innuendo, ambiguity and half-truth
is more efficacious . . . than factual assertions. Facts are dull and dangerous;
exaggerations are vivid, attractive and privileged....
"Any exemption of puffs or opinion is especially serious in the field of drug
advertising, which consists in large measure of therapeutic claims." Quoted from
Handler, "The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act," 6
Law and Contemp. Prob. 91, 99-100 (1939).
161 Positive Products Co. v. F.T.C., 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942):
To an educated analytical reader, these and similar statements may not seem
to claim anything more than to relieve delayed menstruation. But the buying
public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each word in an advertise-
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technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as to mislead or
deceive."' 62
A Reader's Digest article on cigarettes and their nicotine-and-
tar-content advertisements reached the conclusion: "The differences
between brands are, practically speaking, small, and no single brand
is so superior to its competitors as to justify its selection on the ground
that it is less harmful." An accompanying table to indicate how small
were the differences showed Old Gold as the lowest. This was im-
mediately seized upon by P. Lorillard Co. "to advertise this difference
as though it had received a citation for public service," referring to the
Reader's Digest as authority for its claims. When challenged, the
company defended the truth of its advertisements, "saying that they
merely state what had been truthfully stated in the Reader's Digest."
The court characterized the company's advertising as "a perversion
of the meaning of the Reader's Digest article which does little credit
to the Company's advertising department-a perversion which results
in the use of the truth in such a way as to cause the reader to believe
the exact opposite of what was intended by the writer of the article."' 63
3. No Prejudice to Public
The fact that buyers may not be prejudiced economically through
deception or false advertising because they are given "equivalent value"
has not prevailed as a defense for misleading advertising.
Where the issue is one of unfair competition, Mr. Justice Cardozo
disposed of this defense in a case involving the substitution of cheaper
western yellow pine for white pine:
We have yet to make it plain that the substitution would be unfair
though equivalence were shown.... The consumer is prejudiced if
upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied with something
else. . . . In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it
chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by
fashion or perhaps by ignorance .... Dealers and manufacturers
are prejudiced when orders that would have come to them if the
lumber had been rightfully named, are diverted to others whose
methods are less scrupulous. 64
The public is equally entitled to protection against deception
concerning the sources from which it buys. "If consumers or dealers
prefer to purchase a given article because it was made by a particular
ment. The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the
sum total of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably implied.
162 Bockenstette v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943).
163 P. Lorillard Co. v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1950).
164 F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1934).
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manufacturer or class of manufacturers, they have a right to do so,
and this right cannot be satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly
similar article, or one equally good, but having a different origin. 16 5
The issue of no prejudice to the public was most sharply presented
in recent cases involving the marketing of reclaimed lubricating oil.
The record showed "that lubricating oil does not wear out with use;
that use does not change the chemical composition of the oil or its
molecular structure but merely contaminates it; and that contamina-
tion from use as well as additives put into the oil by the prior producer
are eliminated by the re-refining process." It was also shown that the
producers had no unfair advantage over their competitors, and that
the enforcement of disclosure that the product was re-refined from
used motor oil would lessen competition. To all of which the court
replied: "But the public is entitled to know the facts with respect to
the lubricating oil sold by the petitioners being produced from previ-
ously used oil and then make its own choice with respect to purchasing
such oil or oil produced from virgin crude, even though the choice is
predicated at least in part upon ill-founded sentiment, belief, or
caprice.' 66
4. No Injury to Private Right
A defense in terms of no injury to a private right is quite irrelevant
where the statute is concerned with the public interest in maintaining
fair competition and avoiding deception of buyers. However, sub-
stantially this plea was made by Royal Baking Powder Co. in its
argument "that no statute or decided case has declared that a manu-
facturer or trader owes to his competitors the duty of refraining from
misrepresentation of the quality or ingredients of his own goods." 67
5. No Tendency Toward Monopoly
The use of deceptive advertising is an evil in its own right which
the Commission may order eliminated. The Commission's authority
is not limited to practices which tend to create monopoly, but includes
all deceptive practices which either prejudice fair competition or injure
the public.'6
165 F.T.C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1933).
166 Double Eagle Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 265 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). See also Royal Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 262 F.2d 741
(4th Cir. 1959); Mohawk Refining Corp. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959).
167 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., 281 Fed. 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1922).
168 In Winsted Hosiery Co. v. F.T.C., 272 Fed. 957, 960 (2d Cir. 1921), "There
was no combination in restraint of trade nor any attempt to establish a monopoly."
But the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's order in F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery
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6. No Deceit of the Public
The defense that no deception is practiced on the public may be
based on the assumption that the public is given equivalent value or on
the proposition that no member of the public is deceived. It is the
second situation to which attention is directed here.
This argument was rejected with respect to false advertisements
of skin ointment and soap appearing in medical journals and in cir-
culars enclosed with the product, the court noting that an advertiser
may not excuse himself on the theory that the public "should have
known or acted more wisely."'0 9 As Judge Clark so forcefully argued
in Charles of the Ritz v. F. T. C., the advertiser cannot defend his
exaggerations or falsehoods by arguing that "no straight-thinking per-
son could believe"; the public is made up of "the ignorant, the unthink-
ing and the credulous" as well as the sophisticated, and the law aims
to protect the "less experienced.' 170 "Advertisements are intended not
'to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to pro-
duce an impression upon' prospective purchasers.'
1 7 1
7. Early Disclosure
Is advertising unobjectionable if the first misleading impressions
are subsequently corrected? In its advertisements, Carter Products
represented that Arrid "safely stops under-arm perspiration . . . in-
stantly stops perspiration one to three days." The findings of the
Commission established that Arrid only temporarily interrupts the
under-arm flow of perspiration and does not absorb perspiration.
Carter Products argued that they never claimed permament effect and
that the directions on the jar advised "Use daily if necessary" and
"Use as frequently as you find necessary." The court rejected Carter
Products' defense, noting that the prospective buyer reading a news-
paper or magazine advertisement or listening to a radio commercial
has no notice of what is stated on the package.'72
Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922). See also Consolidated Book Publishers v. F.T.C., supra
note 123.
169 Belmont Laboratories v. F.T.C., supra note 144.
'70 Charles of the Ritz v. F.T.C., supra note 143. See also Florence Mfg. Co.
v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910); F.T.C. v. Standard Education
Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); General Motors Corp. v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1940); Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941); D.D.D. Corp.
v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942); Moretrench Corp. v. F.T.C., 127 F.2d
792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942); Positive Products Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 161, at 167;
Stanley Laboratories v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 388, 392-393 (9th Cir. 1943).
171 Positive Products Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 161; Newton Tea & Spice Co.
v. United States, 288 Fed. 475, 479 (6th Cir. 1923).
172 Carter Products v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 821, 822-824 (7th Cir. 1951).
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"The law is violated if the first contact or interview is secured by
deception, . . . even though the facts are made known to the buyer
before he enters into the contract of purchase."'
73
8. No Cure Claimed
It is a not uncommon complaint of advertisers that the enforce-
ment agencies read more into their advertising copy than is literally
there; yet that is precisely the meaning that they expect will be con-
veyed to the general public by the advertisement.
Among the advertising used by Rhodes Pharmacal Co. for Imdrin,
"Amazing New Discovery for Rheumatism, Arthritis," the following
was representative:
* . . Persons whose cases of suffering have been thought almost
hopeless . ..yes, even people who had suffered and hoped for
twenty years, were able to live free of pain . .. like happy human
beings once again. No other medicine for rheumatism and arthritis
thus far discovered by medical science has such an amazing rec-
ord. ... 174
But before the Commission and the courts, Rhodes' position, as stated
by the court, was quite different:
Petitioners urge that there is no substantial evidence in the record
for the Commission's finding that they represented that Imdrin con-
stituted an adequate, effective and reliable treatment for all forms
of arthritis and rheumatism. They point out that they never used
the word "cure" in their advertisements and assert that their product
was offered to the public only as a relief from pain. It is apparent
they made an effort to avoid the use of the word "cure" although one
radio advertisement stated, "In a moment I'll be back to tell you
folks who have been suffering from arthritis, sciatica, rheumatism
and neuritis, news about Imdrin . .. the brand-new, safe and reli-
able way to cure pain that's being prescribed by many doctors to
bring quick, pleasant relief from arthritis pain, stiffness, and
swelling." Furthermore, in other ads petitioners often included de-
scriptions of situations which to many potential users, might well
imply a cure, such as: "Imdrin ... brings marvelous freedom from
pain," and "For them (users of Imdrin) the aching joints and
muscles are a thing of the past," which would lead such persons to
believe or hope that Imdrin would effect a cure from their previ-
ously existing condition. . . .They did not confine themselves
to asserting that Imdrin was for relief of pains or aches from
rheumatism or arthritis. In several instances the courts have held
that a representation that a preparation is to be used "for" a
173 Id. at 824. See also F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, supra note 123;
Progress Tailoring Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 117; Book-of-the-Month Club v. F.T.C.,
supra note 124.
174 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. F.T.C., 208 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 23
FALSE ADVERTISING
disease is equivalent to labeling it a cure or remedy for such dis-
ease.175
Responsibility for false and misleading advertising may not be
avoided by refined and technical distinctions between what is written
or said and what the public reads or understands.
9. Practices of the Trade
False advertising may not be defended on the ground that it
conforms to the mores of the trade. This was the explicit ruling of the
Supreme Court in requiring accurate labels for part-wool underwear."'
The 6% financing plan for automobile sales was misleading although
widely used in the industry. 7 7 A related argument urges that unequal
competition or competitive inequities will result from the prohibition
of a practice that others are still free to pursue. 78 This is a matter
that lies wholly within the discretion of the Commission, and the courts
will not accept competitive inequities as a justification for vacating
or postponing the effectiveness of a Commission order . 79
10. No Responsibility for Salesmen's Representations
The firm that seeks to take advantage of deceptive misrepre-
sentations in selling its product or service cannot escape the conse-
quences by arguing that its salesmen are independent. The principal
is bound by the acts of the salesmen employed, if such acts are within
the actual or apparent scope of their authority, even when the decep-
tive acts and practices are unauthorized.' Sellers who provide their
representatives with deceptive sales materials and instruct them in the
use of deceptive tactics are equally guilty of using unfair and deceptive
practices.' 8'
175 Id. at 386. See also Carter Products v. F.T.C., 286 F.2d 461, 475 (9th Cir.
1959); Positive Products Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 161.
176 "The fact that misrepresentation and misdescription have become so common
in the knit underwear trade that most dealers no longer accept labels at their face
value does not prevent their use being an unfair method of competition. A method
inherently unfair does not cease to be so because those competed against have become
aware of the wrongful practice. Nor does it cease to be unfair because the falsity of
the manufacturer's representations has become so well known to the trade that dealers,
as distinguished from customers, are no longer deceived." F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery
Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
177 Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 120, at 182.
178 Royal Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., supra note 166, at 743-744.
179 Moog Industries v. F.T.C., 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).
180 Goodman v. F.T.C., supra note 159; Consumer Sales Corp. v. F.T.C., 198
F.2d 404, 406-407 (2d Cir. 1952); Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d
437, 440 (2d Cir. 1944); International Art Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 116, at 398.
181 C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 197 F.2d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 1952); Inter-
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11. Statements of Opinion in Good Faith
In an appeal from a Commission order directed against false
advertising of various cancer cures, the producers of the drugs argued
that "therapeutic value is not a matter of fact but of opinion and that
it 'can never be a "material fact" that can be falsely represented within
the contemplation of the last sentence of section 15(a)(1).' M182
While the court was prepared to agree that certain statements set
forth in a book and in medical articles could be considered statements
of opinion, the situation was quite different when it came to advertise-
ments. In the advertisements, the representations made with respect
to the value of the drugs were in positive language, not the language
of opinion.. "To the lay person the declaration that a drug does or
does not have a certain effect is a representation of fact. The state-
ment that a cancer case has been cured is a statement of fact.' 83
The defense of "opinion" and "good faith" can seldom prevail.
The fact of misrepresentation does not depend upon the good or bad
faith of the advertiser, but upon the impression that the advertisement
makes on the public to which it is addressed.'84
12. Difficulties of Compliance
The difficulties-of-compliance defense refers to matching the
product to the advertising. As such, it is a completely illogical defense.
There is always the possibility of matching the advertising, or the
label, to the product. Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the court's modi-
fication of a Commission order to allow Procter & Gamble Co. to
produce "naptha" soap with a one percent naptha content at the
time of manufacture when it might not, at time of sale, contain enough
naptha to have any cleansing capacity from that ingredient.8 5 The
court was much less considerate of a pillow manufacturer that urged
the difficulties of maintaining trade-rules standards. 18
13. The Tariff Acts
The Commission directed importers of imitation pearls to cease
marketing them without clearly disclosing the country of origin. The
national Art Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 116; F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., supra
note 176, at 494.
182 Koch v. F.T.C., supra note 133, at 317. See also De Forest's Training, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 134 F.2d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 1943).
183 Koch v. F.T.C., supra note 133, at 318.
184 Id. at 317, 319.
185 Procter & Gamble Co. v. F.T.C., 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1926).
186 "The fact that petitioners may have to regulate their mechanical separating
machines so as to attempt to produce the feather and down content specified in the
labels, instead of aiming at that amount less the 15% tolerance, is not a denial of due
process." Buchwalter v. F.T.C., 235 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1956).
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importers sought to avoid the Commission's jurisdiction by urging that
they were complying with the Tariff Act of 1938. The court found this
no excuse.
187
14. Statements in Patent Claims
Vacudex, a device to be attached to automobile exhausts, was
advertised as saving gasoline and oil, increasing the power of the
motor, and giving better engine performance. A Commission order
denying the continued use of these claims was appealed. It was argued
that the challenged statements were part of the patent application,
and that the Commission's order was an attack on the patent system.
The majority of the court held that, as the patent did not cover the
functions of the invention, the Commission's order was not an attack
on the validity of a patent; the order was affirmed.'
If patent claims or statements in patent applications could grant
immunity with respect to the use of those claims in advertising the
product, there would be a new and most urgent reason for writing
patent applications in broadest terms.
15. Food and Drug Act Jurisdiction
In a proceeding involving the labeling and advertising of fruit
preserves, the allegations, except with respect to advertising, were
established. Thereupon the company argued that since the definition
of false advertising in section 15(a) excludes labeling, there could be
no violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This defense was
rejected by the court, for the Commission had found the company to
be engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of section 5
of the act.8 9 The jurisdiction of the Commission to prevent unfair
competition and deceptive practices by false labeling and misbranding
are thoroughly established with respect to all kinds of products. 90
16. Abandonment of Practices
The discontinuance of false advertising or other unlawful prac-
tices does not necessarily preclude the issuance of a cease and desist
187 "Our examination of the amended tariff act discloses no language expressing an
intention on the part of Congress to repeal section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, or to diminish the authority or the power of the Commission to prevent deceptive
trade practices . . . ." L. Heller & Son v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1951).
188 Decker v. F.T.C., 176 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
189 Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
190 Parfums Corday v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1941); Justin Haynes & Co.
v. F.T.C., 105 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1939); Fioret Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 100 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1938); F.T.C. v. Morissey, 47 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1931); F.T.C. X. Good-Grape
Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 167;
F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., supra note 176.
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order by the Commission.' 9 While it had been said that the Commission
may not issue a cease and desist order as to practices long discontinued
and as to which there is no reason to expect their renewal, 19 the Com-
mission has a broad discretion to determine whether a cease and desist
order is required.'93 Where the deceptive advertising was discon-
tinued after the Commission had instituted a general investigation
into the advertising practices of health and accident insurance com-
panies, the circumstances were held to warrant the issuance of an
order.194
17. A Prior Stipulation
A prior stipulation is no bar to the issuance of a complaint where
the advertiser entering into the stipulation stated that if any competi-
tor resumed the objectionable practices, the advertiser would feel free
to do likewise. 95 A stipulation is, of course, no bar to subsequent pro-
ceedings against subsequent violations of the statutes. 9 6
18. Res Judicata
Res judicata can seldom be a successful defense in any matter
before the Commission. The Commission has noted that "the doctrine
of finality ordinarily applicable to judicial proceedings is not applica-
ble to Commission proceedings," for "no order . . .can prejudice the
statutory right and duty of the Commission to initiate any future
action .. . required by changes of fact or law or by the public in-
terest."' 97 Nevertheless, the Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration have each found prior actions of the other agency an
impediment to proceeding against the same respondent on related
issues and facts. 9"
THE COURTS AND ADVERTISING
While the preceding analysis has been concerned largely with
decisions of the courts in advertising cases arising on appeal from the
191 Fairyfoot Products Co. v. F.T.C., 80 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1935). See also Philip
R. Park v. F.T.C., 136 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943); Gaiter v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 810
(7th Cir. 1951).
192 F.T.C. v. Civil Service Training Bureau, 79 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir. 1935).
193 Marlene's v. F.T.C., 216 F.2d 556, 559-560 (7th Cir. 1954).
194 Automobile Owners Safety Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 154, at 197-198.
195 Fairyfoot Products Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 191. See also Stanley Laboratories
v. F.T.C., supra note 170.
19G Rock v. F.T.C., 117 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1941); Bond Stores, No. 6789, FTC,
Jan. 7, 1960.
197 Manco Watch Strap Co., No. 7785, FTC, March 13, 1962. See also F.T.C. v.
Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942).
198 George H. Lee Co. v. F.T.C., 113 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1940); United States v.
Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944).
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Federal Trade Commission, the questions considered have not been
central to the judicial issues with which the courts are primarily con-
cerned. These essentially judicial questions fall into two classes:
the judicial interpretation of the statutory standards for the regulation
of advertising, and the judicial enforcement of the Commission's
authority-affirming, modifying or denying its orders, punishing viola-
tions of Commission orders, and granting injunctions.
1. Judicial Interpretations of Statutory Standards
The role of the courts in reviewing the findings and orders of the
Federal Trade Commission are specified in the Act. "The findings of
the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be
conclusive."' 99 The appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to en-
tertain appeals from the orders of the Commission on the basis of "a
transcript of the entire record . . . including all the evidence taken
and the report and order of the Commission." If the taking of addi-
tional evidence becomes necessary, the additional evidence is taken
before the Commission, which may make new findings and recommend
any appropriate modification of its order.
In reviewing the decisions and orders of the Commission, the
courts of appeal seek to establish that the Commission's determinations
are supported by substantial evidence "on the record considered as
a whole." The courts must give due consideration to whatever the
record contains which detracts from the weight of the evidence sup-
porting the Commission's decision. The courts may not substitute
their own findings for those of the Commission; they "cannot pick
and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary to the
findings of the Commission." 0 The Supreme Court has emphasized,
in respect to the work of the National Labor Relations Board, that the
responsibility of the courts to canvass the whole record to ascertain if
there is substantial support for the administrative agency's decision is
not "intended to negative the function of the Board as one of those
agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with
a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry
the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore
must respect."2 0l
Similarly, the decisions of the courts of appeals will not be dis-
turbed by the Supreme Court when these decisions are confined to a
199 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 52 Stat. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c),
amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
200 F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 117 (1937).
2ol Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 490
(1951).
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fair assessment of the record on the sole issue of substantial support,
even though the Supreme Court might find the record tilting either
way on that issue 22 Because it has the "authority of an expertness"
in its field, the Commission's determinations with respect to the weight
to be given to the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them are
also entitled to the respect of the courts °0 The Commission's de-
termination in the presence of conflicting evidence is likewise final,
"even though the evidence is so conflicting that it might have supported
the contrary had such findings been made."204 When, however, the
lower courts fail to heed the statutory instruction that the Commis-
sion's findings, "if supported by testimony," are conclusive, Supreme
Court admonishment may be expected, as in the Algoma Lumber Co.
case:
... [T]he Court of Appeals, though professing adherence to this
mandate, honored it, we think, with lip service only. In form the
court determined that the findings of unfair competition had no
support whatever. In fact, what the court did was to make its own
appraisal of the testimony, picking and choosing for itself among
uncertain and conflicting inferences. Statute and decision . . .
forbid that exercise of power 205
The Commission is presumed to have expert experience in dealing
with unfair competition and deceptive practices generally, and with
false and misleading advertising specifically, 206 and it may draw upon
its experience in order to determine, even in the absence of consumer
testimony, the natural and probable result of specific advertising.20
The district courts have no jurisdiction to enter a declaratory
202 National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498
(1951).
203 "The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the stipulated facts do not sustain the
Commission's finding that the use of association prices by members outside the State
where they are located has a tendency to lessen competition and to fix uniform prices
in such territories. The validity of the inference or conclusion drawn by the Commis-
sion and of this part of the order depends upon the proper estimation of the facts
stipulated. The language specifically relating to such use of the agreed prices if con-
sidered alone might possibly be deemed insufficient. But the Commission is not confined
to so narrow a view of the case. That part of the stipulation properly may be taken
with all the admitted facts and the inferences legitimately to be drawn from them."
F.T.C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 61 (1927).
204 Standard Distributors v. F.T.C., 211 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1954).
205 F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra note 164, at 73.
206 F.T.C. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
207 E. F. Drew & Co. v. F.T.C., 235 F.2d 735, 741 (2d Cir. 1956); DeGorter v.
F.T.C., 244 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1957); Carter Products v. F.T.C., 268 F.2d 461,
493-495 (9th Cir. 1959).
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judgment as to the limits of the Commission's authority to control
advertising and labels."'
a. Competition in Commerce
The jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission with respect
to "commerce" has not been fully litigated. Section 5 refers to methods
of competition in commerce, and "commerce" is specifically defined as
interstate and foreign commerce or commerce within a territory or the
District of Columbia. Clearly the Commission's authority has not yet
been recognized as having the reach of that of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to all matters affecting interstate commerce, but this may
be because the proper questions, adequately supported by economic
facts, have not been presented to the courts. The Federal Trade Com-
mission has been more reluctant than, say, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in dealing with matters which indirectly affect interstate
and foreign commerce; it has been held back by its own restrained
interpretation of "in commerce."
The Commission, having issued orders against 120 firms engaged
in selling assortments of candy in interstate commerce, issued a similar
order against Bunte Brothers, an Illinois manufacturer supplying
"break and take" candy packages to the Illinois market. The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking, found
this an unwarranted extension of the Commission's power to deal with
"unfair methods of competition in commerce."20 9 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter found important distinctions between the problems presented
to the Interstate Commerce Commission and those confronting the
Federal Trade Commission. But Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting,
found that "the evil here is direct, injurious discrimination against
interstate commerce," and argued, "the Act, an exercise by Congress of
its commerce power, should be interpreted to protect interstate com-
merce not to permit discrimination against it."21 His logic, stated in
syllogistic form, was simple:
Unfair competition involves not only an offender but also a vic-
tim. Here some of the victims of the unfair methods of competition
are engaged in interstate commerce. The fact that the acts of the
offender are intrastate is immaterial. The purpose of the Act is to
protect interstate commerce against specified types of injury. So far
208 Miles Laboratories v. F.T.C., 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
209 "The construction of § 5 urged by the Commission would thus give a federal
agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore tradi-
tionally left to local custom or local law." F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354
(1941).
210 Id. at 357. He was joined in dissent by Justices Black and Reed.
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as the jurisdiction of the Commission is concerned, it is the existence
of that injury to interstate commerce not the inter-state or intra-
state character of the conduct causing the injury which is imporant.
An unfair method of competition is "in" interstate commerce not
only when it has an interstate origin but also when it has a direct
interstate impact. Respondent is "using" unfair methods of compe-
tition "in" interstate commerce when the direct effect of its conduct
is to burden, stifle, or impair that commerce 2 1
The fundamental "criterion for exercise of the Congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce is the effect of an act upon it and not its
source, 2 12 and the Commission should test more fully the scope of
"in commerce." If our antitrust laws are to be adequate to their task
in preserving a free economy, the Commission would be well advised
to act on Mr. Justice Douglas' theory of commerce and provide the
courts with specific opportunities to reconsider whether the laws of
commerce cannot be brought into harmony with the economics of
competition.
The use of advertising is a recognized and integral part of the
production and distribution of goods in interstate commerce, and as
such it is subject to the regulatory powers of the Commission even
though the advertising itself is not in interstate commerce.2 13 More-
over, it is not necessary that there be any sales in interstate commerce
to give the Commission jurisdiction over false advertising.2 14
The Commission may prohibit false advertising of correspondence
school courses in Latin American countries by American enterprises,
since such competition affects other American firms seeking to serve
the same market2 15 The Commission may not reach unfair or decep-
tive acts unless "the unfair acts of traders" are "in the affected
commerce."
216
211 Id. at 356.
212 DeGorter v. F.T.C., supra note 207, at 273-274.
213 Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175, 183 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
214 Section 12 makes it unlawful to disseminate any false advertisement either by
the United States mails or in commerce. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52. See Shafe
v. F.T.C., 256 F.2d 661, 663-664 (6th Cir. 1958).
215 ,.. . It is true that much of the objectionable activity occurred in Latin
America; however, it was conceived, initiated, concocted, and launched on its way in
the United States. That the persons deceived were all in Latin America is of no
consequence. It is the location of the petitioner's competitors which counts." Branch
v. F.T.C., 141 F.2d 31, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1944).
216 Thus the Commission was unable to prohibit the continued dissemination of
disparaging statements about the use of aluminum cooking utensils by an author and
publisher who were not engaged in the manufacture or sale of cooking utensils. Scientific
Manufacturing Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 150, at 643-44.
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b. Substantial Evidence
In all Commission proceedings it has been the rule from the be-
ginning that the Commission has the burden of proof and the Com-
mission has been consistently required, by the courts as well as by its
own rules, to rest its findings and orders on substantial evidence. This
standard is clearly, but indirectly, indicated by the provision for
judicial review of the Commission's orders, wherein it is provided that
"the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive. 2 117 Whether the evidence in any par-
ticular proceeding is sufficient is "a question of fact primarily for the
Commission to decide from the entire record."21 But this determina-
tion is always subject to court review.
As previously discussed, the courts defer to the Commission if
its findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if the court
might reach a different conclusion.219 In the matter of false advertising,
the Commission is not required to depend upon formal testimony to
establish the capacity of a misleading advertisement to deceive; it
may draw upon its experience and common sense to determine that
fact. °0 The Commission (or its hearing examiner) has the responsi-
bility for passing upon the credibility of witnesses, determining the
weight to be accorded to their testimony, and resolving conflicts of
evidence."' In considering false advertising of foods, drugs, cosmetics,
217 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 52 Stat. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c),
amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914). The Administrative Procedures Act provides in section 7(c)
that "the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof," and that no
"order [shall] be issued except upon consideration of the whole record . . . and in
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
218 Carter Products v. F.T.C., supra note 207, at 487.
219 "Even assuming that some of the testimony on behalf of the Commission was
prejudiced or biased as contended, if the Commission wished to rely upon such testi-
mony, we may not intervene whatever our thought." Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 150
F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1944). This appears to be an overstatement of the deference rule.
See also Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. F.T.C., 157 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1946).
220 "The Commission is not required to sample public opinion to determine what
the petitioner was representing to the public. The Commission had a right to look at
the advertisements in question, consider the relevant evidence in the record that would
aid it in interpreting the advertisements, and then decide for itself whether the practices
engaged in by the petitioner were unfair or deceptive, as charged in the complaint."
Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944). See also Royal Oil'
Corp. v. F.T.C., 262 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1959); New American Library of World
Literature v. F.T.C., 213 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1954); HiUman Periodicals v. F.T.C., 174
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1949).
221 "The possibility of drawing either of two inconsistent inferences from the evi-
dence does not prevent the Commission from drawing one of them." Carter Products
v. F.T.C., supra note 207, at 491.
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and therapeutic devices, the Commission may rely upon the opinion
of experts testifying on the basis of their general medical and pharma-
cological knowledge, even though these experts have had no clinical
experience with the specific product. Such evidence constitutes "sub-
stantial evidence" even in the presence of conflicts of opinion."2
Despite the rule respecting "findings of facts supported by sub-
stantial evidence," there are situations, some of them surprising, where
the lower courts have rejected the Commission's findings or conclu-
sions: the identity of a breed of hogs,223 the significance of trade names
applied to soaps,224 the interpretation of the meaning of trade practice
rules respecting the contents of down pillows, 5 and the protection
afforded by a colloidal graphite motor oil under conditions when the
oil supply was depleted.220 The Commission's orders have been vacated
when the court was unimpressed with the pictorial exaggeration of the
thickness of a mattress. 27 One court saw no need for an order re-
quiring furniture manufacturers to label their furniture as "veneered,"
when "all furniture of the better quality has its flat surfaces con-
structed of ply wood, or laminated and veneered woods" and "only
the cheaper and poorer grades of less valuable material are constructed
of solid woods. ' 228 Another court vacated a Commission order restrain-
ing a manufacturer of automobile mufflers from advertising that his
continuous-electric-welded seams would prevent rusting and that other
constructions of mufflers resulted in greater danger of carbon mon-
oxide poisoning." 9 An order running against the advertising of a
weight-reducing candy was vacated because the court judged that
eating candy before meals would result in reducing weight with no
restriction of diet since the candy would automatically restrain the
desire for food.? ° However, after a court concluded that "Cashmora,"
222 Erickson Hair and Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 272 F.2d 313, 321-22 (7th Cir.
1959); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 185 F.2d 58, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1950); Fulton v.
F.T.C., 130 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942); Alberty v. F.T.C., 118 F.2d 669, 670 (9th Cir.
1941) ; Neff v. F.T.C., 117 F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1941); Dr. v. B. Caldwell v.
F.T.C., 111 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1940); Justin Haynes & Co. v. F.T.C., supra note
190.
223 L. B. Silver Co. v. F.T.C., 289 Fed. 985 (6th Cir. 1923).
224 Allen B. Wrisley v. F.T.C., 188 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1940).
225 Burton-Dixie Corp. v. F.T.C., 240 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1957); Lazar v. F.T.C.,
240 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1957).
226 Kidder Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941).
227 Ostermoor & Co. v. F.T.C., 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
228 Berkeley & Gay Furniture Co. v. F.T.C., 42 F.2d 427, 429 (6th Cir. 1930).
If the better grades of furniture are veneered, what is the objection to so designating
them?
229 International Parts Corp. v. F.T.C., 133 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943).
230 Carlay Co. v. F.T.C., 153 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1949).
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with fiber content disclosed, was not deceptive, the Commission on
remand found the label deceptive and required that it be discontinued
for garments not containing substantial, and disclosed, amounts of
cashmere.231
c. Unfair Competition
While it forbids unfair methods of competition and deceptive
practices in commerce, the act defines neither term. The first judgment
as to what constitutes unfair competition or a deceptive practice is
the Commission's responsibility. This responsibility is satisfactorily
discharged only when the Commission develops an adequate record
that establishes why the practice is unfair or deceptive, particularly
in terms of its probable consequences.
What makes a business practice unfair or deceptive has been said
to be a "matter of law" ultimately to be determined by the courts.
The early views that related unfair methods of competition to restraints
of trade and tendency toward monopoly were soon abandoned, not
merely where false and deceptive practices resulted in unfair compe-
tition to other competitors but also where deception of the public was
the evil.232 False advertising, misbranding, and other practices which
deceive the public are recognized as injuring competitors who do not
use them. But the presence of competitors must be shown, and the
unfair competitive effects-diversion of trade, damage or injury to a
competitor-should appear or be clearly inferable from the circum-
stances. 3 While the act is not concerned with isolated events, "unfair
methods" may be shown by two advertisements for a single sale or by
the issuance of three old motion pictures with new titles 34
d. Deceptive Practices and False Advertising
The courts have been strongly inclined to defer to the Commission
with respect to what advertising is false and misleading and what prac-
tices are deceptive. Both the meaning and the falsity of advertising
representations are said to present questions of fact to be determined
by the Commission, and this finding of fact must be accepted by the
231 Elliott Knitwear v. F.T.C., 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); Elliott Import Corp.,
No. 6637, FTC, Oct. 24, 1961.
232 Consolidated Book Publishers v. F.T.C., 53 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1931); Berkeley
& Gay Furniture Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 228; Masland Duraleather Co. v. F.T.C.,
34 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1929) ; Procter & Gamble Co. v. F.T.C., 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1926) ;
L. B. Silver Co. v. F.T.C, supra note 223; Royal Baking Powder Co v. F.T.C., 281
Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922); F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
233 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). See also Allen B. Wirsley v.
F.T.C., 118 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1940).
234 Gimbel Bros. v. F.T.C., 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941); Fox Film Corp. v. F.T.C.,
296 Fed. 358 (2d Cir. 1924).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
courts unless "arbitrary or clearly wrong. 2 3 Indeed, the Commission
may determine from an examination of the advertisement, relying on
its own judgment and experience, whether the advertisement is false
or deceptive. 36
The false advertising or deceptive acts need not be such as would
constitute fraud;237 nor need intent to deceive be shown.
23 1
Actual deception of the public need not be shown to support a
finding of false advertising.239 The test of falsity is whether the ad-
vertising has a natural tendency and capacity to deceive.24 0 This is
to be determined by considering the total impression of the advertise-
ment, not by critical dissection of each sentence2 4 1
e. Public Interest Test in Advertising
The public interest is a prerequisite to the assumption of juris-
diction by the Commission rather than a test of propriety of issuing a
cease and desist order 42 As a practical question, the court is con-
cerned only with whether the matter is too trivial to justify the Com-
mission's attention.2 43 Many factors may demonstrate the public in-
terest in false advertising: the substantial volume of the advertiser's
business,244 the presence or absence of a probability of deception of
the public,2 45 a threat to the health of the public,24 6 a diversion of busi-
235 Carter Products v. F.T.C., supra note 207, at 496. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v.
F.T.C., 150 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1945).
236 Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., supra note 220.
237 D.D.D. Corp. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
238 Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. F.T.C., 26 F.2d 340, 342 (2d Cir. 1938) ; F.T.C. v.
Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928).
239 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., supra note 197, at 152; F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery
Co., supra note 232, at 494; Brown Fence & Wire Co. v. F.T.C., 64 F.2d 934, 936
(6th Cir. 1933); F.T.C. v. Balme, supra note 238, at 620; Herzfeld v. F.T.C., 140 F.2d
207, 208 (2d Cir. 1944); Bockenstette v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943).
240 F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934); American Life & Accident
Insurance Co., 255 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1958)'; Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., supra
note 219, at 755; F.T.C. v. Balme, supra note 238, at 620; Indiana Quartered Oak
Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 238, at 342.
241 F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, supra note 200, at 116; Ford Motor
Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 213, at 182; F.T.C. v. Balme, supra note 238, at 622; P.
Lorillard Co. v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
242 Northern Feather Works v. F.T.C., 234 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1956); F.T.C. v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
243 Moretrench Corp. v. F.T.C., 127 F.2d 792, 794 (2d Cir. 1942).
244 International Parts Corp. v. F.T.C., supra note 229, at 885.
245 Irwin v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 316, 325 (8th Cir. 1944); Pep Boys--Manny, Moe &
Jack v. F.T.C., 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1951); Arnold Stone Co. v. F.T.C., 49 F.2d
1017 (5th Cir. 1931).
246 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., supra note 233, at 646-647; Koch v. F.T.C., 206
F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953).
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ness from those not engaging in false advertising,247 or a violation of
Trade Practice Rules. 4
2. Judicial Enforcement of Commission Authority
The discretion of the Commission in the selection of a remedy and
the framing of its orders has undergone substantial modification over
the years. In the earlier years, the courts showed little reluctance to
rewrite Commission orders. Then following a series of Supreme
Court decisions, most of which did not relate to the work of the Federal
Trade Commission, the principle was established that the administra-
tive agencies have a large measure of autonomy in writing their reme-
dial orders.
a. A Broad Discretion in Commission Orders
The explicit affirmance of the newly recognized discretion of the
Commission in the drawing of its orders came in an opinion involving
a misleading corporate name. Judge Learned Hand expressed the rul-
ing principles as follows:
However, . . . the Supreme Court has as much circumscribed our
powers to review the decisions of administrative tribunals in point
of remedy, as they have always been circumscribed in the review of
facts. Such tribunals possess competence in their special fields which
forbids us to disturb that measure of relief which they think neces-
sary. In striking that balance between the conflicting interests in-
volved which the remedy measures, they are for all practical pur-
poses supreme. . . . Congress having now created an organ endued
with the skill which comes of long experience and penetrating study,
its conclusions inevitably supersede those of the courts, which are
not similarly endowed. 249
This ruling is generally accepted as authoritative, but in a proceeding
involving a long used trade name, "Alpacuna," the court's expression
of its view that the Commission's order of complete prohibition was
unduly harsh was accompanied by an affirmance of the order.25 0 An
appeal in behalf of "Alpacuna" was taken. Mr. Justice Douglas ex-
pressed the Supreme Court's strong affirmance of the broad discretion
of the administrative agency in the matter of remedies, but noted that
the public policy of protecting valuable business assets, such as a trade
247 F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., supra note 232, at 493; Ford Motor Co. v.
F.T.C., supra note 213, at 182; Alberty v. F.T.C., supra note 222, at 670; Dr. W. B.
Caldwell v. F.T.C., supra note 222, at 890-891; Electro Thermal Co. v. F.T.C., 91
F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1934); F.T.C. v. Real Products Corp., 90 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir.
1934) ; F.T.C. v. Artloom Corp., 69 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1934).
248 Prima Products v. F.T.C., 209 F.2d 405, 407-408 (2d Cir. 1954).
249 Herzfeld v. F.T.C., 140 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1944).
25o Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 219, at 755-756. See also Parke,
Austin & Lipscomb v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 437, 441-442 (2d Cir. 1944).
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name, made it appropriate to call upon the Commission to consider if
some remedy "short of excision" would protect the public from decep-
tion.251 The new responsibility imposed upon the administrative agen-
cies with the grant of wide discretion in writing orders is even more
essential than deferring to their findings of fact. In the field of trade
regulation, it is less important that an order follow legal precedent
than that it fit the patterns of competition of the industry to which it
is applied.
The Commission has issued somewhat more inclusive orders in
some recent cases. Thus, two sellers of scalp treatments and medica-
tions for baldness have been prohibited for making false advertising
claims of the type condemned, not only with respect to present scalp
preparations, but also with respect to "any other preparations for use
in the treatment of hair and scalp conditions."'2 52
b. A Requirement of Affirmative Disclosure
The Commission has required affirmative disclosures respecting
a number of drugs and cosmetics. To support such orders, it must
find "(1) that failure to make such statement is misleading because of
the consequences from the use of the product, or (2) that failure to
make such statement is misleading because of the things claimed in
the advertisements. '2 53 When it has failed to make the requisite find-
ings, its orders have been modified;24 where the necessary findings are
made, its requirements of affirmative disclosures have been affirmed 2 55
Affirmative disclosures may also be required for products not falling
within the Wheeler-Lea categories.2 56
Despite the broad discretion enjoyed by the Commission with
respect to its orders, a number of such orders relating to misleading
advertising and similar deceptive practices have been modified. In
several modification orders, the courts have seemed more sensitive to
the needs of the seller than to the protection of the buyer.257 In the
251 Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608 (1946). See also F.T.C. v. Mandel
Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391-393 (1959); Alberty v. F.T.C., 182 F.2d 36, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
252 Erickson, Hair and Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959);
Voss Hair Experts v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Niresk Industries
v. F.T.C., 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960).
253 Alberty v. F.T.C., supra note 251, at 39.
254 Ibid.
255 Ward Laboratories v. F.T.C., 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); Fell v.
F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
256 Theodore Kagen Corp. v. F.T.C., 283 F.2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The product
here was watch cases.
257 Kidder Oil Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 226; F.T.C. v. Hires Turner Glass Co.,
81 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1936); Procter & Gamble Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 232.
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medical and cosmetic cases, the justification for the modifications of
the orders are difficult to appreciate. Those modifications of orders
which related to trade names present distinct issues of public policy. 9
3. Enforcement Orders
No study has been made of the enforcement orders of the courts
with respect to the Commission's advertising cases 60 A very brief
survey of the fines imposed for violations of court decrees and Com-
mission orders would indicate that pecuniary penalties are not an im-
portant factor in seeking better compliance. The penalties are too
small to have any deterrent effect. For example, P. Lorillard Co. was
fined $40,000 for violation of a cease and desist order. 61
In one criminal contempt proceeding, the court found three cor-
porate officers guilty of contempt and fined them as well as the cor-
poration. Two sought reconsideration on the ground that they had no
authority within their corporation to deal with advertising matters.
The court rejected their argument, noting that they had a responsibility
to seek a change in the corporation's policy."
Injunction proceedings have not been a prominent part of the
Commission's regulatory activities, and no study has been made of
these cases. In addition to its injunction powers under the Wheeler-Lea
amendments with respect to food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices (sec-
tion 13), the Commission has injunctive powers under the Wool (sec-
tion 7) and Textile Fiber (section 8) acts, and condemnation and in-
junction powers under the Fur (section 9) and Flammable Fabrics
(section 6) acts.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
False advertising is a by-product of the compulsions of a compe-
titive economy. It can only be controlled by unending surveillance.
The law has made good progress in establishing workable legal princi-
ples, but administrative practice has lagged in accomplishing what the
law now permits or directs. Both business and the consuming public
258 Gelb v. F.T.C., 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944); Ultra-Violet Products Co. v.
F.T.C., 143 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1944); D.D.D. Corp. v. F.T.C., supra note 237; Belmont
Laboratories v. F.T.C., 103 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1939); Lekas & Drivas v. F.T.C., 145 F.2d
976 (2d Cir. 1944); Folds v. F.T.C., 187 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1951); Rhodes Pharmacal
Co. v. F.T.C., 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953); Dolcin Corp. v. F.T.C., 219 F.2d 742
(D.C. Cir. 1954); Sewell v. F.T.C., 240 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1956).
259 Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., supra note 251; F.T.C. v. A.P.W. Paper Co., 328
U.S. 193 (1946); Elliott Knitwear v. F.T.C., supra note 231.
260 Federal Trade Commission, Statutes & Decisions, include sections in each volume
reporting the "Penalty Proceedings."
261 P. Lorillard Co., 267 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1959).
262 In re Dolcin Corp., 247 F.2d 524, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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would benefit by more effective control of false advertising. And more
effective control is attainable with a few clearly indicated changes in
legislative directives and administrative procedures.
1. Accomplishments in Control of Misleading Advertising
The most important advances in coping with false advertising
have come in the train of the Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938. The
definition of false advertising as an advertisement that is false in any
material fact or that fails to disclose a material fact has greatly
strengthened the authority of the Federal Trade Commission. The
Commission's powers have been further enhanced by specific legisla-
tion covering the marketing of wool, furs, and textile fibers-supply-
ing additional legislative safeguards against false advertising. These
Congressional determinations of what constitutes falsity in advertising
have been used by the Commission and the courts, not only for the
commodities specifically covered, but also for commodities in general,
both in cases arising under sections 12 to 15 and those brought under
section 5. This is consistent with the legislative provision that viola-
tions of these special sections shall be considered to be violations of
section 5. The influence of the strict standards in the later statutes
may be seen particularly in Commission orders requiring affirmative
disclosures to permit consumers to evaluate products more accurately.
The Commission has notable achievements to its credit in the
application of the statutory standards to a wide variety of false ad-
vertising problems. Many of the worst aspects of advertising of a
generation ago have been largely eliminated. The courts have con-
tributed materially to the more effective policing of advertising: up-
holding the primary responsibility and competence of the Commission
to determine the facts, to weigh the evidence, to draw reasonable con-
clusions on the basis of the Commission's extensive experience with
the strategies and tactics of competition, and to prescribe effective
remedies; rejecting the specious defenses that have been offered for
false advertising; insisting upon the superior rights of the honest com-
petitor and the public to protection against unfair and deceptive ad-
vertisements.
The control of false advertising calls for continuous policing. It
is a responsibility for both business and government. Business can
help by using the Trade Practice Conference procedure to establish
high standards of truth in advertising and by reporting all observed
instances of false advertising to the Commission. Business has a high
stake in bringing probity to advertising; in the long run business suffers
when the public loses confidence and comes to realize that it can ex-
pect only deceit in an industry's advertising. And, of course, individual
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companies suffer when unfair advertising diverts patronage that would
normally come to them. The advertising industry has the greatest
interest in maintaining high standards of integrity in advertising, for
if the public comes to regard advertising as pervasively false and mis-
leading, advertising will cease to have value to industry and com-
merce, distributors will have to develop other techniques for achieving
and maintaining mass markets, and advertising specialists will have
to seek new occupations. However, a large responsibility for maintain-
ing non-deceptive advertising must be carried by the government-to
deal with the unscrupulous, to police industries lacking in ethical stand-
ards, and to apply critical judgment to new advertising tactics and new
products.
2. Requisites for More Effective Control of Advertising
More effective control of false advertising is possible and desirable.
More effective administration is called for to apply higher standards
of advertising broadly and generally to all industries and all markets.
Better coverage in policing is required in the interests of business, par-
ticularly within individual industries, to eliminate competitive inequi-
ties that arise when some, but not all, members of an industry are sub-
ject to cease and desist orders respecting false advertising.
a. Conceptual Tools for Regulation
The criteria for identifying false advertising under the Wheeler-
Lea provisions are admirably designed for their task. The same cri-
teria should apply to false advertising as a "deceptive practice" under
section 5.
These criteria, while helpful, are not adequate when "false adver-
tising" is an unfair method of competition. Here deception of the
public and injury to competitors are not enough2 6 3 The essence of
the offense under the "unfair competition" test is the interference with
the efficient functioning of the markets upon which the soundness of
the entire economy depends. It is in this sense that false advertising,
like other forms of unfair competition, is a public offense (rather than
a private wrong), and it is the impairment in the efficiency of the
economy that makes honest, informative advertising-and the avoid-
ance of false advertising-a matter of solid public interest.
b. The Advertising Agencies
The brinkmanship that is responsible for many false advertising
cases involving reputable firms and reputable products is in significant
263 In a normal market situation, competitors would suffer more from the honest
advertising of a good product than from the deceptive advertising of a poor product.
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measure the result of rivalry among advertising agencies, each anxious
to demonstrate its ability to increase its client's sales. While the
advertiser must approve the program submitted by the agency, it is
the agency which generates the deceptions, sometimes without its
client's knowledge. It is, therefore, wholly appropriate that the agency
as well as the advertiser should be joined in the complaints and orders
of the Commission-each is a beneficiary of the deceptive advertising,
each should bear the public opprobrium of being branded as engaging
in false advertising, deceptive practices, and disruption of markets.
With the agencies regularly joined in Commission cases, the adver-
tisers might begin to choose between those agencies which do a skill-
ful job and those which bring their clients unfavorable publicity.
In the Carter's Little Liver Pill case, the Commission's opinion
indicated that it would expect its staff to cite the advertising agencies
in every case when the facts might warrant.64 However, the inclusion
of the advertising agency has attracted attention only with the Com-
mission's drive against false demonstrations and other deceptions
in television advertising. The television demonstrations of aerosol
shaving creams have educated the public in the techniques of false
demonstrations. The appearance of superiority of "Rise" in com-
parison with "ordinary" shaving creams was achieved with the use
of a ten percent solution of "ultra-wet 60L," a foaming agent having
none of the properties of a shaving cream, but prepared so that it
would come out of the can "in a good puff and would quickly dis-
appear. ' 26 5 Colgate's "Rapid Shave" cream was falsely demonstrated
as shaving sandpaper, but the television "sandpaper" was a plexiglass
mock-up and the cream would not moisturize real sandpaper in any
reasonable length of time.266 The Commission rejected the arguments
of Ted Bates that it should not be joined in the order on grounds
that it was not engaged in commerce, 6 ' that it was merely an agent of
Colgate in preparing and placing the television commercials, 268 and
264 Carter Products, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1137, 1170 (1951).
265 Carter Products, Inc., Sullivan, Stauffer, Colwell & Bayles, Inc., No. 7943,
FTC, Apr. 25, 1962.
266 Colgate-Palmolive Co., Ted Bates & Co., No. 7736, FTC, Dec. 29, 1961.
267 The Commission replied: "There is no dispute that Bates prepared and placed
for showing, over national network television, these commercials for 'Palmolive Rapid
Shave,' a product distributed in interstate commerce. In the light of the precedents,
one can hardly doubt the Commission's jurisdiction over an enterprise so basic to
the flow of goods into the national market."
268 The Commission retorted: "All that is necessary to establish liability in this
type of case is that the corporate officer 'be shown to have had such connection with
the wrong as would have made him an accomplice were it a crime, or a joint tort-
feasor, were the corporation an individual.'"
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that it did not know that its "sandpaper test" commercials would be
held to be false and misleading. A number of similar cases have been
settled by consent orders.269
c. A Show Cause Procedure
The Commission has the "burden of proof" in establishing the
facts with respect to the false or deceptive character of advertising.
Why should the burden of proof be on the Commission? Where an
advertiser makes affirmative factual claims for his product, why should
he not sustain the burden of proving the accuracy of his statements?
These questions are crucial if there is to be any substantial im-
provement in the performance of the Commission in this area of trade
regulation. If the Commission is to meet the challenge of false ad-
vertising, in behalf of the advertising industry, business generally, and
the consumer, the Commission must be provided with more effective
procedures.
The principal obstacle to more effective control of misleading
advertising is the protracted character of many cases. To satisfy the
requirements of present procedures, the Commission must prove the
false character of the advertisement which is already obvious to the
advertiser and the Commission; the Commission must develop sources
of information to supply information which is, or should be, in the
possession of the advertiser; and the Commission must satisfy a litiga-
tion procedure which is unduly cumbersome for this type of case. All
of this could be changed by legislation which would prescribe a "show
cause" procedure for advertising cases.
Under a show cause procedure, the Commission would be re-
quired to proceed 'by issuance of a complaint which would set forth
the prima facie basis for believing that a particular advertisement is
false and misleading. The complaint might be directed against an
individual advertiser, as an individual or as a representative of an
industry or trade, or against all members of an industry or trade. In
any advertising case, other members of the industry or trade should
have the right to intervene. The complaint should set a date for a hear-
ing within 30 days of the issuance of the complaint, but the respondent
should have the right to seek a postponement for another 30 days.
The issuance of a complaint should constitute notice to the in-
dividual, or to the industry or trade, as the Commission designates,
269 In Standard Brands, Inc., Ted Bates & Co., No. 7737, FTC, Jan. 8, 1960,
the "flavor gems" seen on Blue Bonnet margarine were drops of a non-volatile liquid
applied to the surface of the product and having nothing to do with the flavor.
In Eversharp, Inc., Compton Advertising, Inc., No. 7811, FTC, Mar. 10, 1960,
the false demonstration related to the alleged superior safety of the Schick safety razor.
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that three months after the date of the complaint the challenged ad-
vertising would become a violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, subject to all the penalties attaching to the violation of a Com-
mission's final order. The provision for the automatic suspension of
advertising covered by a complaint would serve to protect other com-
petitors and the public if the pending litigation should become pro-
tracted. At present, one of the principal reasons for prolonged ad-
vertising litigation, from the point of view of the advertiser, is that,
pending final determination, the advertiser is able to continue to profit
from his advertising.
The issuance of a Commission order following final determination
on a show cause proceeding should establish a "rule" or "order" ap-
plicable to all advertising of that product, or class of products, by all
advertisers in that market.
d. Penalties
The small penalties characteristically imposed for violations of
advertising orders are no deterrent. Many of the penalties are less
than the cost of a single advertisement in a magazine of national cir-
culation. The courts should levy full penalties for violations of ad-
vertising orders as an essential step in more effective enforcement.
e. Other Measures for Controlling Deceptive Advertising
The objective in the regulation of advertising should be informa-
tive disclosure regarding all advertised products. This is what is al-
ready required by the special laws dealing with wool products, furs,
and textile fibers. The use of established technical standards, where
available and applicable, and the development of quality grade labels
would enable buyers to respond to advertising appeals with an intelli-
gent examination and comparison of products. The general extension
of the procedures of these special acts with the use of informative
grades or standards, perhaps as a new function of the Federal Trade
Commission, would do much to increase the efficiency of the entire
economy and to establish reasonable equality of competitive conditions
in most markets, even in some markets characterized by monopolistic
conditions.
